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1. Introduction 
 Proponents of Bayesian confirmation theory believe that they have the solution to a 
significant, recalcitrant problem in philosophy of science. It is the identification of the logic that 
governs evidence and its inductive bearing in science. That is the logic that lets us say that our 
catalog of planetary observations strongly confirms Copernicus’ heliocentric hypothesis; or that 
the fossil record is good evidence for the theory of evolution; or that the 3oK cosmic background 
radiation supports big bang cosmology. The definitive solution to this problem would be a 
significant achievement. The problem is of central importance to philosophy of science, for, in 
the end, what distinguishes science from myth making is that we have good evidence for the 
content of science, or at least of mature sciences, whereas myths are evidentially ungrounded 
fictions.  
 The core ideas shared by all versions of Bayesian confirmation theory are, at a good first 
approximation, that a scientist’s beliefs are or should conform to a probability measure; and that 
the incorporation of new evidence is through conditionalization using Bayes’ theorem. While the 
burden of this chapter will be to inventory why critics believe this theory may not be the solution 
after all, it is worthwhile first to summarize here the most appealing virtues of this simple 
account. There are three. First, the theory reduces the often nebulous notion of a logic of 
                                                
1 I am grateful to Malcolm Forster for helpful discussion on an earlier draft. 
2 
induction to a single, unambiguous calculus, the probability calculus. Second, the theory has 
proven to be spacious, with a remarkable ability to absorb, systematize and vindicate what 
elsewhere appear as independent evidential truisms. Third is its most important virtue, an 
assurance of consistency. The larger our compass, the more we must digest evidence of diverse 
form and we must do it consistently. Most accounts of evidence provide no assurance of 
consistency in their treatment of larger bodies of evidence.2 Bayesian confirmation theory 
affords us a simple picture: the entire bearing of evidence at any moment is captured by a 
probability distribution. No matter how large a body of evidence we contemplate, we will not be 
led to contradictions in our evidential judgments as long as we form and update our beliefs in 
conformity with the probability calculus. 
 Perhaps because of these virtues, Bayesian confirmation theory now enjoys the status of 
the leading account of induction and confirmation in the philosophy of science literature. Those 
who expect this circumstance to persist should recall that the present success of Bayesianism is 
relatively momentary. The probability calculus was born over 350 years ago in the seventeenth 
century in correspondence between Pascal and Fermat. One hundred years later, in the eighteenth 
century, the Reverend Thomas Bayes published his theorem as part of a proposal that probability 
theory be used to answer Hume’s inductive skepticism. Nonetheless, the idea that the probability 
calculus afforded the right way to understand inductive inference remained a minority view. The 
dominant view of induction in the nineteenth century followed in the tradition of Bacon and his 
tables, with its most influential expression in John Stuart Mills’ System of Logic (1891). This 
dominance persisted through to the mid twentieth century.3 It competed with hypothetico-
                                                
2 Some even fail in simple cases. Consider an enumerative induction on the white swans of 
Europe, which lets us conclude that all swans are white; and an enumerative induction on the 
black swans of Western Australia, which leads us to the contradictory conclusion that all swans 
are black. 
3 Mill’s methods remain to this day the single most important methodological idea for computer 
repair people and auto mechanics seeking to diagnose problems. Their reach persists in the 
methodological literature at least to Skyrms (1975), whose Ch. IV gives a detailed development. 
See the historical survey of Blake, Ducasse and Madden (1960) for a broader sense of the minor 
role probability theory has played in the longer term history of ideas of scientific methodology. 
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deductive approach to inductive inference. That view’s venerable history can be traced through 
Descartes’ method of hypothesis to ancient Athens were astronomers were, as legend has it, 
asked by Plato to find the geometrical planetary constructions that would “save the phenomena” 
of astronomy (Duhem, 1969). As recently as a few decades ago, the philosophy of science 
literature was filled with proposals for dealing with Hempel’s (1945) notorious “paradox of the 
raven.” That paradox arose within a development of Hempel’s “satisfaction” criterion of 
confirmation, that was itself merely the ancient notion of enumerative induction transported from 
the context of Aristotle’s syllogistic logic to modern, first order predicate logic. These differing 
approaches played out against persistent claims by Popper (1959) and his followers that the very 
notion of a logic of induction is mistaken. The Bayesian approach to induction and confirmation 
rose to dominance in philosophy of science only slowly in the course of the second half of the 
twentieth century,4 with its importance codified by such works as Howson and Urbach (2006). 
 Given this history of competing traditions in induction and confirmation rising and falling 
over the centuries, it seems only prudent to expect that the Bayesian approach will recede from 
its present prominence and once again be merely one of several useful instruments for assessing 
inductive inference relations. The goal of this chapter is to review the weaknesses recounted in 
the literature that may drive this decline. It will draw on two sources. First are those outside the 
Bayesian fold who present direct challenges; second are shortcomings identified by Bayesians, 
who in turn have sought modifications within the Bayesian system. These two literatures overlap 
sufficiently for it to be impractical for me to disentangle them.5 
 The survey will proceed from larger to smaller issues. Section 2 will review global 
challenges to Bayesian confirmation theory. These challenges derive from differences in the 
basic conception of inductive inference and the principles that govern it. They include the view 
that notions of inductive inference are merely artifacts subservient to whatever methods may 
reliably get us to the truth; and the proposal that there is no universally valid logic of induction, 
but only localized logics adapted to individual domains. Section 3, 4 and 5 are based on a 
decomposition of Bayesian confirmation theory into independent, components, which are 
                                                
4 Glymour (1980, p. 64) identifies the influence of Carnap (1950) as decisive. 
5 Hence I apologize in advance to Bayesians who feel that their work has been mischaracterized 
as a challenge to Bayesianism. 
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presented as intuitive notions pertaining to confirmation. Additivity amounts to a decision that 
degrees of probability span belief and disbelief, not belief and ignorance; the essence of 
Bayesian dynamics is glossed as the incorporation of new evidence by a simple rule of “refute 
and rescale” prior belief. This decomposition supports a catalog of challenges to the specific 
Bayesian commitment. Among them is “the problems of the priors,” which proves to be multiple 
problems aggregated under one label. One—here called first problem—is that additivity 
precludes prior probabilities that represent a state of complete ignorance. The second problem 
derives from the simplicity of refute and rescale dynamics. It precludes specification of a neutral 
prior probability distribution that exerts little influence on the future course of conditionalization. 
Section 6 reports some further challenges and Section 7 is a brief conclusion. 
 Some topics lie largely outside the compass of this chapter. In statistical practice, as 
opposed to philosophy of science, an epochal battle continues to be waged between proponents 
of traditional Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing and Bayesian approaches. That debate has 
been of far less importance in philosophy of science and will be addressed by Deborah Mayo and 
Aris Spanos (this volume).6 Within the Bayesian literature itself, the dominant problem has been 
to find the correct interpretation of probability: subjective, objective or logical? To someone who 
is at a slight distance from Bayesianism, the debate seems misdirected in setting standards of 
precision for the interpretation of a central term of a theory that are rarely achieved elsewhere 
and are probably unachievable for probability. Its energy is reminiscent of an internecine feud 
among sect members who agree vastly more than they differ, but nonetheless tolerate no 
doctrinal deviations. This topic will be addressed only in so far as it arises in broader challenges 
to the Bayesian approach. These debates are addressed by Sandy Zabell (This Volume) and 
Philip Dawid (This Volume) as well as survey volumes (Galavotti, 2005; Gillies, 2000; Mellor, 
2005). 
                                                
6 For a brief account from the perspective of a philosopher sympathetic with the Bayesian 
approach, see Howson (1997); and for a brief history from someone with opposing sympathies, 
see Mayo (manuscript). 
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2. Competing Accounts of the Nature of Inductive Inference 
 Any theory of inductive inference depends upon one or more principles or presumptions 
that distinguish the right inductive inference relations. These principles must be there, whether 
they are made explicit, or, as is the more usual case, left tacit. The most fundamental of the 
challenges to Bayesian confirmation theory come from differing views of these principles.  
2.1 Alternatives 
 Given the large number of approaches to inductive inference, one might imagine that 
there is a plethora of competing principles. A recent survey (Norton, 2005), however, shows that 
most accounts of inductive inference can be grouped into one of three families, there called 
“inductive generalization,” “hypothetical induction” and “probabilistic induction.” Each family 
is based upon a distinct inductive principal and the different members emerge from efforts to 
remedy the deficiencies of the principle. 
 While it is impossible to give detailed descriptions of each family, it is useful here to 
indicate the breadth and longevity of the first two, which compete with the third probabilistic 
family. Accounts of induction belonging to inductive generalization depend on the principle that 
the instance of a hypothesis confirms the generalization. This ancient notion was implemented in 
syllogistic logic as enumerative induction: an A that is B confirms that all As are B. The 
principal weakness of this archetype of the family is that it may allow rather little to be inferred. 
We cannot use it to pass from the evidence of a 3oK cosmic background radiation to the theory 
of big bang cosmology. The embellishments of the archetype are devoted to extending the reach 
of enumerative induction. Hempel’s satisfaction criterion reformulates the basic notion within 
the richer, first order predicate logic. Mill’s methods extend it by licensing the inference to a new 
notion, cause. In the Method of Agreement, if A is seen to follow a, then we infer this pattern 
will persist generally and label a as the cause of A. Glymour’s “bootstrap” account of 
confirmation uses instance confirmation to enable evidence to confirm hypotheses that employ 
theoretical notions than are not explicitly mentioned in the evidence. For our purposes, what 
matters is that all these approaches to induction depend upon the basic principle that an instance 
confirms the generalization. 
 Accounts of induction belonging to hypothetical induction depend on the principle that 
the ability of an hypothesis deductively to entail the evidence is a mark of its truth. The 
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archetype of accounts is this family is the saving of the phenomena in astronomy. That some 
model of planetary motions correctly fits and predicts the observed positions of the planets is a 
mark of its truth. The principal weakness of this principle is that it assigns the mark too 
indiscriminately. There are many planetary systems—geocentric, heliocentric and more—that 
can save the phenomena of astronomical appearances. They are all equally assigned the mark of 
truth, even though there must be some sense in which one saves the appearances better than 
another. Embellishments of this basic notion are intended to rein in the reach of hypothetical 
induction by adding further conditions that must be met to earn the mark. The hypothesis that 
saves the phenomena must be simple, or simpler than its competitors; or we must in addition be 
assured of an exclusionary clause: that were the hypothesis that saves the phenomena false, then 
it would be unlikely for the phenomena to obtain.7 Other versions require hypotheses not just 
deductively to entail the evidence, but also to explain it. Ptolemy’s model of planetary motion 
entails that Venus and Mercury will always appear close to the sun. Copernicus’ model explains 
why: these planets orbit the sun. Finally, another sort of embellishment enjoins us to take into 
account the historical process through which the hypothesis was generated. It must be generated 
by a method known to be reliable. Generating hypotheses ad hoc is not judged reliable. 
Parapsychologists hypothesize retrospectively that their experiments failed in the presence of 
skeptics because of the unintended obstructive influence emanating from the skeptics. We are 
free to discount this as an ad hoc hypothesis. 
2.2 Bayesian Annexation 
 All these accounts represent challenges to Bayesian confirmation theory in that they are 
grounded in and can be developed in a framework that does not need the familiar structures of 
                                                
7 One important form of this is Mayo’s (1996) error statistical approach to inductive inference in 
science. It requires evidence to provide a “severe test” of an hypothesis. The above exclusionary 
clause is realized in Mayo’s (1996, p. 180) severity requirement: “There is a very low probability 
that test procedure T would yield such a passing  result, if [the hypothesis] H is false.” It of 
special interest here since its debate with Bayesian confirmation theory replicates in philosophy 
of inductive logic the tensions between Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing and Bayesian 
approaches in statistics. For a Bayesian rejoinder, see Howson (1997, §4). 
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Bayesian confirmation theory. The natural Bayesian rejoinder is that the two basic principles and 
their embellishments can be absorbed and vindicated by the Bayesian system. 
 Whether one finds this possibility compelling depends on whether one finds this gain 
worth the cost of adopting the extra structures and commitments that Bayesian confirmation 
theory requires (such as will be discussed in Sections 3-5 below). The absorption and vindication 
can sometimes be quite successful. The clearest case is the success of the Bayesian analysis of 
when the success of an hypothesis H entailing true evidence E should count as inductive support 
for H. (Earman and Salmon (1992, §2.7) A familiar application of Bayes’ theorem8 
! 
P(H | E)
P(~ H | E)
=
P(E | H )




shows that the degree of support is controlled essentially by the likelihood ratio P(E|H)/P(E|~H). 
If it is high, so that the evidence is much less likely to come about if H is false than if it is true, 
then the posterior probability P(H|E) increases correspondingly with respect to the prior 
probability P(H). If the likelihood ratio is close to one so that E is pretty much as likely to come 
about whether or not H is true, then P(H|E) enjoys no such increase. The analysis is appealing in 
that it vindicates the basic principle of hypothetical induction, as well as going beyond it in 
indicating when it will not work. 
 Other efforts at absorption have been less successful. In Section 5 below, we shall the 
difficulties facing Bayesian efforts to explicate notions like predictive power and simplicity. The 
problem is that the simple structures of the Bayesian theory do not have enough resources to 
distinguish the case of an hypothesis H merely entailing evidence E from it entailing it in a 
virtuous way that merits confirmatory rewards. 
 There also seems to be some troubling elasticity in the way that a Bayesian vindication of 
independent inductive norms is achieved. Sometimes it seems that almost any norm could be 
justified. The problem is illustrated by difficulties faced in a simple example due to Carnap, as 
summarized by Earman and Salmon (1992, pp. 85-89). The traditional form of inductive 
inference called “example” is a weakening of enumerative induction that merely infers from 
                                                
8 The terms have their obvious meanings. For example, P(H|E) is the (posterior) probability of H 
conditioned on E; P(H) is the (prior) probability of H against the tacit background. See Section 5 
below. 
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instances to instances: these cases of x are X; so that new case of x will also be X. The 
illustration deals with finitely many individuals a, b, c, … that may carry a property F (written 
“Fa” etc.) or fail to carry it (written “~Fa” etc.) The individual possibilities are described by state 
descriptions, such as Fa&Fb&~Fc&…. Carnap initially assigned equal probability to each state 
description. The immediate outcome was that the argument form “example” failed. Learning that 
Fa and Fb are true leaves the probabilities of Fc and ~Fc unaffected. That could be offered as a 
proof of the failure of “example,” if one was inclined against the argument form. Carnap, 
however, was not so inclined. He chose to readjust the probabilities on the state descriptions in a 
way that favored correlations between the properties, so that “example” ends up being 
vindicated. 
 Closer reflection on Carnap’s illustration shows that the vindication (or otherwise) of the 
inductive argument form “example” does not depend on anything inherent in the probability 
calculus. Rather it depends upon additional assumptions we make. In this case it is our 
determination of whether the individuals under consideration are correlated in the loose sense 
that one individual carrying F tends to go with another also doing so. If we decide they are so 
correlated, then “example” is vindicated, whether we express the vindication formally within a 
probabilistic analysis or merely as a restatement of the informal notion of correlation. 
 This suggests that the Bayesian vindication of inductive norms is less a matter of 
extracting them from the probability calculus and more one of our introducing them as 
independent assumptions that can be expressed in probabilistic language.9 That makes them far 
less impressive than they initially seemed. One virtue does persist: since we are likely to want to 
combine many possibly competing inductive principles, if we do it within the framework of the 
probability calculus, we have some assurance that they will be combined consistently. 
                                                
9 Other examples are easy to find. The Bayesian analysis of hypothetical induction above 
depended essentially on our specifying as an independent assumption that the ratio 
P(E|H)/P(E|~H) is large. That amounts to the external assumption that E would much more likely 
likely come about if H is the case than if it is not, which already pretty much gives us the 
principle wanted. 
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2.3 Bayesian Foundational Principles 
 The strongest response to these challenges of other principled accounts would be for 
Bayesian confirmation theory to display its own principled foundation, justify it and argue for its 
superiority. However prospects here are not strong. Bayesian confirmation theory is distinctive 
among accounts of confirmation theory in that a great deal of effort as been expended in seeking 
to justify it. These efforts are usually associated with different interpretations of probability and 
vary markedly in character according to the interpretation. While the literature on this problem is 
enormous, there seems to be no vindication that is widely agreed to be successful. Rather the 
agreement lies only with the conclusion that has to be reached—that the probability calculus is 
the logic of induction. Each Bayesian seems to find his or her own path to this conclusion, often 
from widely diverging starting points and with critical dismissal of other starting points. 
 A few examples will illustrate the divergences in the starting points and their difficulties. 
The most promising approach is associated with a relative frequency interpretation of 
probability, such as sought in Salmon (1966, pp. 83-96). In it, the probability of a scientific 
hypothesis would simply be the relative frequency of true hypotheses in a reference class of 
hypotheses of the appropriate type. Since relative frequencies behave mostly like probabilities, 
it is easy to conclude that the probability calculus is the natural logic of induction, which is 
largely reduced to the simple task keeping count of truth in relevant reference classes. The 
proposal fails because of the insurmountable difficulty of defining which are the appropriate 
reference classes, let alone assuring that the appropriate relative frequencies are unique and well 
defined in the resulting infinite sets. 
 Another popular approach seeks to identify necessary conditions that any inductive logic 
must meet. A version has recently been developed by Jaynes (2003) following Cox (1961). The 
attendant interpretation of probability is objective, in the sense that, in any one circumstance, 
there is one correct probability assignment, even though we may not know it; and is “logical” in 
the sense that the probabilities are treated as degrees of a logical relationship of support. The 
approach is strong in that, if there is a unique logic of induction to be found, circumscribing it by 
an ever-narrowing fence of necessary conditions will isolate it. Its difficulty is that it needs to 
convince the reader of the necessity of a list of conditions: that belief comes in numerical degrees 
that are always comparable; that the degree of belief assigned some proposition must be a 
function of those assigned to its disjunctive parts; and further, more specialized suppositions. We 
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shall dissect these sorts of conditions in Sections 3, 4 and 5 below and find that they seem 
necessary only if one believes from the start that degrees of belief are probabilities.10 
 Finally, in association with a subjective approach to probability, there are arguments that 
arrive at the probability calculus by urging that any distribution of belief not in accord with the 
probability calculus exposes us to the danger of a combination of wagers that assure a loss. 
These are the Dutch book arguments, best known from the work of de Finetti (1937). In a related 
approach, such as Savage (1972), natural conditions on our actions are translated into conditions 
on beliefs. The first and most evident weakness of these proposals is that they require a quite 
substantial body of presumptions on our actions and preferences and the rules that should be 
used to relate them to our beliefs. The arguments can be defeated by denying a major 
presumption. I may simply be unwilling to bet; or I may never find a bet such that I am 
indifferent to which side I take; or I may harbor intransitive preferences.11 
                                                
10 For example, the belief assigned to A&B is assumed to be a function of the belief assigned to 
A and to B given A. It is natural to assume this if one imagines all along that “belief” is just a 
code word for probabilities or frequencies. However, if one does not prejudge what “belief” must 
be, the assumption of this specific functional dependency is alien and arbitrary. For a natural 
counterexample that violates the rule, see Norton (2007, p. 144, fn. 6). Similar difficulties arise 
for attempts to use “loss functions” or “scoring rules” as a means of vindicating the Bayesian 
system, such as in Joyce (1998). They depend on using a scoring rule that picks out the subspace 
of additive measures as local optima in the larger space of all belief functions. Any such scoring 
rule must be selected carefully so as to enforce a coupling between belief in an outcome A and 
its negation ~A; for an arbitrary change in the belief assigned to A must force a suitable change 
in the belief in ~A to ensure that optimal scoring occurs only in the subspace of additive 
measures. That coupling is just the sort of dependency noted in Section 4.1 and in (A’) that is 
tantamount to choosing additivity. However natural they may seem, the specific conditions 
chosen to endow scoring rules with this particular property amount to a prior decision to interpret 
low belief values as disbelief rather than ignorance or some mix of disbelief and ignorance. In 
the latter case, belief in an outcome is no longer closely coupled to the belief in its negation.  
11 Hájek (2008) argues that four of the principal means of vindicating Bayesianism fail, each in 
the same way. The means are the Dutch book arguments, representation theorem arguments, 
11 
 However there is a deeper problem. These approaches fundamentally change the question 
asked. It was: when is this observation good evidence for that hypothesis? The presumption of 
the question is that evidential support obtains independently of our beliefs and actions. These 
arguments then change the question in two steps that introduce dependencies on our beliefs and 
actions. First, the question of evidential support (Does the fossil record support evolution 
theory?) is replaced by the question of distributions of belief (How do we distribute our belief 
over evolutionary theory and its competitors?). At this stage, prior to consideration of actions, we 
are to accept that there is no one right distribution of belief. Yours is presumed as good as mine. 
Second, rules are provided for translating beliefs into actions, so that the consequences of our 
actions can be assessed and used to restrict how we distribute our beliefs, while in general never 
eliminating the possibility of different belief distributions. These rules make most sense if we are 
at a racetrack or engaged in an engineering project where beliefs must be translated into design 
decisions. They are strained if our concern is the question originally asked: whether, for 
example, the observed motion of the galaxies provides good evidence for the hypothesized heat 
death of the universe, billions of years in the future—a circumstance independent of our beliefs 
and actions. The two-step process has produced an answer to a question, but it is not the question 
with which we started. 12 
                                                                                                                                                       
calibration arguments and gradational accuracy arguments. Each depends on displaying a 
theorem that is interpreted to show that rationality forces Bayesianism. Each vindication, Hájek 
urges, overlooks a “mirror-image” theorem that shows the reverse, that rationality requires 
degrees of belief not to be probabilities. For example, the Dutch book theorem assures the 
existence of a combination of fair bets that forces a sure loss for you if your numerical beliefs are 
not probabilities. Its mirror-image is the “Czech book theorem.” It assures that a benevolent 
Czech bookie can find a combination of fair bets that assures a certain gain for you just if your 
numerical degrees of belief are not probabilities. 
12 For a spirited assault on Dutch book arguments, see Bacchus et al. (1990). They urge these 
arguments fail since an agent should simply refuse to accept a combination of bets that assures a 
loss; it is (pp. 504-505) “a matter of deductive logic and not of propriety of belief.” Schick’s 
(1986) view is similar. 
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2.4 Is There a Unique Logic of Inductive Inference? 
 So far, all the approaches considered—Bayesian and otherwise—have presumed that 
there is a unique logic of induction to be found. Another type of challenge to Bayesian 
confirmation theory denies this. Rather these challenges portray the conditions surrounding 
individual problems as determining which are the appropriate inductive strategies and, from this 
perspective, it turns out that there is no single logic of induction to be identified. Rather than 
having principled grounds for identifying the right inductive logic, these approaches offer 
principled grounds for denying that such a thing is possible. 
 A well articulated version of this approach is the learning theoretic paradigm, as 
developed in Kelly (1996). It presumes that our goal is getting to the truth through some reliable 
method of discovery. At its simplest, an agent receives a potentially unlimited stream of data and 
must formulate hypotheses expressing the pertinent truths of the world, as the data accumulates. 
The central problem of the literature is to discern the sorts of strategies that will lead to 
convergence to the truth in the hypotheses formulated successively, with more rapid convergence 
prized. In certain simple worlds, these methods can be governed by familiar inductive notions. A 
data stream “day, night, day, night, day, …” rapidly succumbs to the hypothesis that day follows 
night and night follows day. In this case, enumerative induction is all that an agent needs to 
formulate the true hypothesis quite early. Matters get more complicated as the problems get 
harder. Looking for regularities in what follows what leads to limited statistical success if the 
problem is weather prediction at one location and the data stream is “rain, shine, shine, shine, 
rain, …”; or stock market prediction with a data stream “up 3 points, up 2 points, down 20 
points, up 3 points, …” There is a small amount of inertia in both the weather and the stock 
market, so that conditions one day tend somewhat to be replicated the next. These methods fail 
completely in inhospitable worlds. If the data stream is derived from a well-designed roulette 
wheel, “red, black, black, red, red, …,” no hypotheses on when red will follow black (other than 
chance) can succeed. And matters can be worse in a demonic universe, which delivers data 
maliciously tailored to deceive the particular agent in question. 
 In this reliabilist paradigm, inductive norms are parasitic on convergence to the truth. It is 
simply a matter of ingenuity to conceive universes in which a given inductive norm will be 
fruitful or harmful. For example, a standard supposition of scientific methodology is that we 
should only advance hypotheses that are consistent with the data at hand. However it turns out 
13 
that, once we allow for the computational limitations of agents, a demand for consistency can 
conflict with reliability. So it may be efficient for us to offer an hypothesis inconsistent with the 
evidence, even though most accounts of induction, including the Bayesian, insists the hypothesis 
has been refuted. For a critique of Bayesian confirmation theory from the reliabilist perspective, 
see Kelly and Glymour (2004). 
 The idea that inductive strategies will vary according to the domain at hand is the central 
idea of the “material theory of induction” (Norton, 2003). Its name derives from the idea that the 
license of an inductive inference does not come from the form of the sentences involved, as it 
does in deductive logic. Rather the license comes from the subject matter of the inference. 
Therefore the inductive logic applicable will vary from domain to domain as the licensing facts 
change; there is no universally applicable logic of induction. 
 In one restricted area, this notion of material facts fixing the inductive logic is already 
familiar to subjective Bayesians through Lewis’ (1980) “principal principle.” For processes for 
which objective chances are available, the principle enjoins subjective Bayesians to match their 
subjective degrees of belief to the physical chances. Quantum mechanical laws deliver chances 
for the timing of the decay of a radioactive atom. If we match our subjective degrees of belief 
concerning those timings to the quantum mechanical chances, then we are assured high belief in 
outcomes that are most likely to happen and low belief in those unlikely to happen. A by-product 
is that our degrees of belief automatically conform to the probability calculus.13 
 The principal principle naturally generalizes to the central claim of the material theory of 
induction: that the factual properties of the system under consideration will determine the 
appropriate inductive logic. It follows that there may be systems whose facts dictate that the 
applicable logic of induction is not probabilistic. Norton (2007, §8.3; manuscript) describes 
                                                
13 The facts that license probabilistic inferences need not be the sorts of physical chances 
recovered from stochastic theories like quantum mechanics. For example, imagine that one is a 
bookmaker accepting wagers on a definite matter of presently unknown fact: say, whether some 
recently discovered infectious illness is viral or bacterial in origin. If the factual conditions 
surrounding the bookmaking conform to all those assumed in Dutch book arguments, then those 
facts determine that one’s degree of belief ought to conform to the probability calculus, on pain 
of exposure to a sure loss. 
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certain physical systems whose governing laws are indeterministic in the sense that the complete 
specification of the present state of the system does not fix the future state; yet these governing 
laws provide no probabilities for the various possible futures. They simply tell us that, given 
such-and-such a present state, this or that future state is possible. In the corresponding inference 
problem, we are required to distribute beliefs over these possible futures, knowing the state of 
the present. If we distributed beliefs as probabilities rather than in some weaker form, we end up 
with beliefs that outstrip the full physical specification as given by the initial conditions and the 
applicable physical laws. We must assert that one possible outcome is twice as probable as 
another; or as probable as another; or half as probable. That is, we must pretend to know more 
than the physical laws, which are only able to assert that each outcome is possible, without any 
sense of “twice as possible” or “half as possible.” 
3. Challenges to Framework Assumptions 
 The challenges considered so far in Section 2 above have been global in the sense that 
they arise from tensions between Bayesian confirmation theory as a whole and other approaches 
to inductive inference. If we recall that Bayesian confirmation theory is a composite of many 
assumptions, then another class of challenges to Bayesian confirmation theory is identifiable. 
These are challenges to specific assumptions of Bayesian confirmation theory. In order to 
structure the inventory of these challenges, the assumptions comprising Bayesian confirmation 
theory will be divided into three parts, called: “Framework,” to be discussed in this section; 
“Additivity,” to be discussed in Section 4; and “Bayes’ dynamics: to be discussed in Section 5.14 
3.1 Framework Assumptions 
 What is common to all versions of Bayesian confirmation theory is the assumption that 
there is a real-valued magnitude, P(H|E), that is one’s subjective degree of belief or some 
objective measure of support for the hypothesis H from evidence E. This apparently simple 
assumption of a real valued magnitude can be decomposed further into a series of assumptions, 
each of which presumes the one before: 
                                                
14 This disassembly is similar to the one effected in Norton (2007), which in turn draws on an 
extensive literature in qualitative probability. For surveys see Fine (1973) and Fishburn (1986). 
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Precision. There is a magnitude P(A|B) that represents the degree of belief or support 
accrued to A given B. 
Universal comparability. It is always possible to compare two such degrees, finding one 
to be less than, equal to or greater than the other. 
Partial order. The comparison relation “no less than” ≤ is a partial order: it is reflexive15, 
antisymmetric16 and transitive17. 
Real values. The degrees are real-valued. 
Different challenges would require us to halt at different stages as we pass up this hierarchy. Lest 
that seem odd, the notion that a cautious ascent is needed may be more palatable if we consider 
an analogous problem of assigning degrees of simplicity to hypotheses. The same hierarchy can 
be formed, but few are likely to ascend all the way to the idea of single real value that measures 
the degree of simplicity of all hypotheses we encounter. We may stall at the start, judging the 
very idea of a degree of simplicity inadmissible. Or we may allow comparison among closely 
related hypotheses only. Jeffreys (1961, p.47), for example, wished to assign greater prior 
probability to simpler hypotheses. So he defined the complexity m of certain differential 
equations as the sum of their order, degree and the absolute values of their coefficients. Unit 
prior probability was then distributed over the resulting complexity classes as a decreasing 
function of m, such as 2-m or 6/π2m2. Jeffreys’ degree is defined only for a specific class of 
equations. It would not sustain universal comparability in that we could not compare the degree 
of simplicity of the hypothesis of a linear relationship between the velocity and distance to the 
galaxies with that of the hypothesis of the germ theory of disease. 
3.2 The Very Idea. 
 The most fundamental objection is that there is something mistaken about the very idea 
of a degree of belief or support that evidence lends to a hypothesis. This objection can rest on the 
                                                
15 For all admissible A, B, P(A|B) ≤ P(A|B). 
16 For all admissible A, B, C and D, if P(A|B) ≤ P(C|D) and P(C|D) ≤ P(A|B), then P(A|B) = 
P(C|D). 
17 For all admissible A, B, C, D, E and F, if P(A|B) ≤ P(C|D) and P(C|D) ≤ P(E|F), then P(A|B) ≤ 
P(E|F). 
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visceral sense that such assignments are simply spurious precision: that we can conjure up a 
number does not mean that we are measuring something. A colorful statement of the mismatch 
of Bayesian analysis with diagnostic clinical practice is Feinstein’s (1977) “The haze of Bayes, 
the aerial palaces of decision analysis, and the computerized Ouija board.” 
 In a different direction, Glymour’s (1980, Ch. III) “problem of old evidence” speaks 
against the idea that the fundamental quantity P(A|B) presumed in the framework is an adequate 
basis for an account of inductive inferences. The import of evidence E on hypothesis H is gauged 
by comparing the prior probability P(H|B) with the posterior P(H|E&B), where B is the totality 
of background knowledge. It frequently happens that the evidence E is already part of our 
background knowledge. The celebrated case concerns the motion of Mercury, which, at the start 
of the 20th century, was know to deviate slightly from the predictions of Newtonian gravitation 
theory. In November 1915, Einstein found that his newborn general theory of relativity “H” 
predicted exactly the observed deviations “E”. The universal agreement is that E provided strong 
support for H. However, since E is part of the background then known to Einstein, we have 
E&B = B 
so that 
P(H|E&B) = P(H|B) 
which shows that E is evidentially inert. 
 If this objection is sustained, it means that a confirmation theory employing only the 
quantities P(H|E) and P(H|E&B) cannot support the judgment that E is good evidence for H.18 
The obvious escape is to replace the prior P(H|B) with an adjusted prior P(H|B’), where B’ is the 
background B with E somehow excised. Glymour’s original presentation sought to block this 
escape by urging that it is quite unclear how this excision could be effected. Other, more 
elaborate escapes are reviewed in Earman (1992, Ch. 5), including the notion that we assign 
evidential value to learning the logical relation between some hypothesis H and the evidence E 
that is already, unbeknown to us, part of our background B. 
                                                
18 Glymour’s original presentation used Bayes’ theorem to deduce P(H|E&B) = P(H|B), although 
the problem is independent of Bayes’ theorem. 
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3.3 Universal Comparability 
 Once we allow that the degree P(A|B) is always defined, it may still not follow that all 
degrees are comparable. Keynes (1921, pp. 37-40) allows that all degrees will lie between those 
assigned to impossibility and certainty, but urges that not all intermediate degrees are mutually 
comparable.  
 The clearest way that comparability can fail is when we conditionalize on very different 
sorts of backgrounds so that we are distributing belief over incommensurable possibilities. For 
example, Norton (2007, pp. 147-48) expands a concern expressed by Humphreys (1985) in the 
context of propensity interpretations to suggest that the direct degrees P(E|H) and the inverse 
P(H|E) may measure very different things. P(E|H) may be derived from the computing of a 
quantity in a stochastic theory: the chance, E, of decay of a radioactive atom in some time as 
deduced from H, the laws of quantum physics. The inverse P(H|E) assigns degrees to different 
physical laws on the basis of the evidence of radioactive decay. The first deals with possibilities 
licensed by a known theory and is grounded in the science; the second deals with speculation on 
how the world might admit different laws whose range is delimited by our imagination. Even if 
we can find protocols that allow us to assign numbers in each case, it is not clear that there is 
anything meaningful in the comparison of those numbers—just as it is meaningless to compare 
degree of temperature and degrees Baumé of specific gravity, even though both are real numbers 
and arithmetic allows the comparison.19 
  That there are different sorts of uncertainty even in decision theoretic contexts is 
illustrated by Ellsberg’s (1961) urns. Consider two urns, each containing 100 balls. The first has 
some combination of red and black balls. Any ratio from 0-100% red is possible and we are 
completely uncertain over which. The second urn has exactly 50 red and 50 black balls. A ball 
will be drawn from each urn. What is our belief that it will be red? For both urns, the symmetry 
of the arrangements requires that we be equally certain of a red or a black, so, in drawing from 
both urns we should be indifferent to making bets on red or on black. Any protocol for 
                                                
19 On the basis of their being “sufficiently disparate,” Fishburn (1986, p. 339) offers the 
following pair as candidates for failure of comparability: “A=Mexico’s City’s population will 
exceed 20,000,000 by 1994; B=The first card drawn from this old and probably incomplete 
bridge deck will be a heart.” 
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converting these inclinations to bet into degrees of belief must respect that symmetry. Therefore, 
if the protocol generates probabilities solely on the basis of these inclinations, in each case it will 
return a probability of 0.5. However Ellsberg suggests that most of us prefer the bet on the urn of 
known composition, so that the degrees of belief assigned to red ought to differ in the two cases. 
For our purposes, this illustrates the possibility of different senses of uncertainty that may not be 
readily comparable if we try to characterize them in a single magnitude. These difference senses 
reflect a distinction to be made in Section 4 below between disbelief and ignorance. 
 Jaynes (2003, pp. 658-59) regards such quibbles over different senses of uncertainty with 
characteristic, entertaining distain. He makes an analogy to a mineralogist who may classify 
rocks with different parameters but can still find a way to trade off changes in one parameter 
against the other to recover a single scale of comparison. 
 The idea that universal comparability must be discarded is a consequence of a significant 
development of the Bayesian approach that has adopted several forms. What they have in 
common is the notion that a single number may not be rich enough to capture the extent of 
belief. That concern is readily motivated whenever we are pressed to assign a definite probability 
to some outcome—say, whether it will rain tomorrow. Assigning a probability 0.6 is too precise. 
Our belief is better represented by something vaguer, a probability somewhere around 0.6. In one 
approach, we might replace definite values by intervals of values; the probability of rain is 0.5 to 
0.7. In another we might take set of probability measures as representing our belief states—say 
the set of all probability measures that assign a probability of 0.5 to 0.7 to rain tomorrow. 
Developing these proposals into well functioning theories is not straightforward. For 
developments of these notions, see Kaplan (1998), Kyburg (1959), Kyburg and Teng (2001), 
Levi (1974; 1980, Ch. 9), Walley (1991). 
 For our purposes, what matters is that these proposals break with the framework sketched 
in that they deny universal comparability. Take the simplest case of interval-valued degrees of 
belief. The belief in some outcome represented by the interval [0.8, 0.9] is greater (in the sense 
of being closer to certainty) than the interval [0.1, 0.2]. But the intervals [0.3, 0.7] and [0.4, 0.6] 
are none of greater than, less than or equal to each other. Analogous effects arise for richer 
structures that dispense with single valued degrees of belief. 
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3.4 Transitivity 
 If we allow that the degrees are always comparable, it does not yet follow that they form 
a partial order, which is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. Of these three properties, 
transitivity is of the greatest concern. Norton (2007, §3.2.2) has suggested that transitivity may 
fail in certain complicated cases if common wisdoms on inductive support obtain. That is, if we 
have a case of evidence entailed by several different hypotheses, it is routine to say that the 
evidence supports one of these hypotheses more than another if the first hypothesis displays 
more of some relevant virtue, such as greater simplicity, greater explanatory power or greater 
fecundity. Using three hypotheses and three virtues, it is easy to envisage structures in which the 
first hypothesis is better confirmed than the second, the second better than the third and the third 
better than the first. This violates transitivity.20 
3.5 Real Values. 
 Once it is allowed that the degrees may be partially ordered, it is still not assured that 
they must be real valued, or isomorphic to the reals or some interval of real numbers. A great 
deal of effort has been expended in determining what additional assumptions are needed to 
assure that the degrees are real valued. These additional assumptions have been given many 
forms and are generally known as “Archimedean axioms.” (Fishburn, 1986, pp. 341-42.) Their 
function is to block the possibility of value sets that extend beyond real values in admitting 
infinitesimally small or infinitely large values. 
 The familiar illustration in this literature of how partially ordered degrees may fail to be 
real valued is generate by degrees that are ordered pairs <x,y> of reals x and y. (Jeffreys, 1961, 
pp. 19-20) They are partially ordered by the rule 
<X,Y>   >   <x,y>   when X > x, no matter the values of Y,y 
or, if X=x, when Y > y 
                                                
20 For the example of a slightly bent coin, Fishburn (1986, p. 339) describes three propositions 
for which intransitivity “do[es] not seem unreasonable”: “A=The next 101 flips will give at least 
40 heads; B=The next 100 flips will give at least 40 heads; C=The next 1000 flips will give at 
least 460 heads.” The suggestion is that we could have the same belief in A and in C; the same 
belief in C and in B, but that we must have more belief in A than B. 
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There is no way to map these degrees <x,y> onto the reals so that the partial order is preserved.  
 We could imagine a two parameter family of hypotheses Hx,y such that our degrees of 
belief in the various hypotheses may be ordered according to the rule just sketched. One might 
doubt whether such a family could arise in realistic problems take that doubt as a reason to 
discount the challenge. Or one might be concerned that adopting a Bayesian confirmation theory 
presumes in advance that such a distribution of belief is inadmissible. Such a presumption is not 
compatible with the universal applicability supposed for the theory. 
4. Additivity 
4.1 The Property 
 Probability measures are additive measures. That means that they conform to the 
condition: 
If A and B are mutually exclusive then, for any C, 
P(AvB|C) = P(A|C) + P(B|C).                                                                         (A) 
Additivity is the most distinctive feature of the probability calculus. In the context of 
confirmation theory, it amounts to assigning a particular character to the degrees of belief of the 
theory. The degrees of this additive measure will span from a maximum value for an assured 
outcome (conventionally chosen as one) to a minimum value for an impossible outcome (which 
must be zero21). If the high values are interpreted as belief with unit probability certainty, then it 
follows that the low values must represent disbelief, with zero probability complete disbelief. To 
see this, recall that near certain or certain belief in A corresponds to near complete or complete 
disbelief in its negation, ~A. 22 If we assign high probability 0.99 or unit probability to some 
outcome A, then by additivity the probability assigned to the negation ~A is 0.01 or zero, so that 
these low or zero values correspond to near complete disbelief or complete disbelief.  
                                                
21 If Imp is an impossible outcome, we have Imp = Imp v Imp. Since Imp and Imp are mutually 
exclusive in the sense that Imp & Imp = Imp, additivity applies so that P(Imp) = P(Imp) + 
P(Imp), from which we have P(Imp)=0. 
22 I take it as a definition that disbelief in A is the same thing as belief in not-A. 
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 This interpretation of low probability as disbelief is already expressed in the functional 
dependency between the probabilities of outcomes and those of their negations. We have 
P(~A|C) = 1-P(A|C), which entails 
P(~A|C) is a strictly decreasing function of P(A|C)                                      (A’) 
More generally, taking relative negations, P(~A&B|C) = P(B|C) – P(A&B|C), we recover the 
more functional dependency 
P(~A&B|C) is a strictly decreasing function of P(A&B|C)                          (A’’) 
and a strictly increasing function of P(B|C) 
These dependencies tell us that a high probability assigned to an outcome corresponds to a low 
probability assigned to its negation or relative negation, which is the characteristic property of a 
scale of degrees that spans from belief to disbelief. 
 While additivity (A) entails weaker functional dependencies (A’) and (A’’), the gap 
between them and (A) is not great. If the functional dependencies (A’) and (A’’) are embedded 
in a natural context, it is a standard result in the literature that the resulting degrees can be 
rescaled to an additive measure satisfying (A). (See Aczel, 1966, pp. 319-24; Norton, 2007, §7.) 
4.2 Non-Additive Measures: Disbelief versus Ignorance 
 Once it is recognized that the additivity (A) of the probability calculus amounts to 
selecting a particular interpretation of the degrees, then the ensuing challenge becomes 
inevitable. In many epistemic situations, we may want low degrees to represent ignorance or 
some mix of ignorance and disbelief, where ignorance amounts to a failure to commit to belief 
or, more simply, an absence of belief or disbelief. Shafer (1976, pp. 22-25) considers how we 
might assign degrees of belief to the proposition that there are living beings in orbit around 
Sirius, an issue about which we should suppose we know nothing. No additive measure is 
appropriate. If we assign low probability to “life,” additivity then requires us to assign high 
probability to “no-life.” That asserts high certainty in there being no life, something we do know. 
The natural intermediate of probability 1/2 for each of the two outcomes “life” and “no-life” fails 
to be a usable ignorance value since it cannot be used if we are ignorant over more than two 
mutually exclusive outcomes. 
 This example makes clear that introducing an element of ignorance requires a relaxation 
of the functional dependencies (A’) and (A’’). It must be possible to assign a low degree of belief 
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to some outcome without being thereby forced to assign a high degree to its negation. Measures 
that allow this sort of violation of additivity are “superadditive”: if A and B are mutually 
exclusive then, for any C, P(AvB|C) ≥ P(A|C) + P(B|C). The extent to which the equality is 
replaced by an inequality is the extent to which the measure allows representation of ignorance. 
 The best-known superadditive calculus is the Shafer-Dempster calculus. In it, an additive 
measure m, called a “ basic probability assignment,” is defined over power set of the “frame of 
discernment” Θ, so that ΣA⊆Θm(A) = 1, where the summation extends overall all subsets of Θ, 
and m({})=0. This measure basic probability assignment is used to generate the quantity of 
interest, the “belief function” Bel, which is defined as 
Bel(A) = ΣB⊆A Bel(B) 
for any A in Θ, where the summation is taken over all subsets B of A. These belief functions 
allow blending of disbelief and ignorance. For example, that we are largely ignorant over the 
truth of “life” can be represented by 
m(life) = 0.1      m(~life) = 0.1     m(life v ~life) = 0.8 
which induces the belief function 
Bel(life) = 0.1      Bel(~life) = 0.1     Bel(life v ~life) = 1 
4.3 Complete Ignorance: The First Problem of the Priors 
 In Bayesian confirmation theory, prior probability distributions are adjusted by Bayes’ 
theorem to posterior probability distributions that incorporate new evidence learned. As we trace 
this chain back, the prior probability distributions represent states of greater ignorance. Bayesian 
confirmation theory can only give a complete account of this learning process if it admits an 
initial state representing complete ignorance. However representing ignorance is a long-standing 
difficulty for Bayesian confirmation theory and the case of complete ignorance has been 
especially recalcitrant. It is designated here as the first problem of the priors, to distinguish it 
from another problem with prior probability delineated below in Section 5.6 below. 
 There are two instruments already in the probability literature that are able to delimit the 
representation of this extreme case, the epistemic state of complete ignorance. Norton 
(forthcoming b) has given an extended analysis of how the two may be used to do this. The first 
instrument is the principle of indifference. It asserts that if we have no grounds for preferring one 
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outcome to a second, then we should assign equal belief to both. This platitude of evidence is 
routinely used to ground the classical interpretation of probability and famously runs into trouble 
when we redescribe the outcome space. Complete ignorance in one description is equivalent to 
complete ignorance in another. That fact allows one to infer quite rapidly that the degree of 
belief assigned to some compound proposition AvB should be the same as the degree of belief 
assigned to each of the disjunctive parts A and B, even though A and B may be mutually 
exclusively.23 Since no probability distribution can have this property, it is generally concluded 
that there is something wrong with the principle of indifference. 
 The difficulty is that the principle of indifference is not so easily discarded. It is a 
platitude of evidence. If beliefs are grounded in reasons and we have no reasons to distinguish 
two outcomes, then we should have the same belief in each. The alternative is to retain the 
principle of indifference and discard the notion that a probability distribution can adequately 
represent complete ignorance. Instead we are led to a representation of complete ignorance by a 
non-probabilistic distribution with three values: Max and Min for the extreme values of certainty 
and complete disbelief and Ig (“ignorance”) for everything in between 
Degree (A) = Max,      for A an assuredly true outcome                                 (I) 
= Min,      for A an assuredly false outcome 
= Ig,         for A any contingent24 outcome 
The essential property here is that we can assign the ignorance degree Ig to some contingent 
outcome AvB and that same ignorance degree to each its mutually exclusive, disjunctive parts, A 
and B. This is the only distribution for which this is true over all contingent outcomes. 
                                                
23 An example is von Mises’ famous wine-water problem. We have a glass with a mixture of 
wine and water, knowing only that the ratio of wine to water lies in 1/2 to 2. So we are 
indifferent to each of the intervals wine to water: (a) 1/2 to 1, (b) 1 to 1 1/2, (c) 1 1/2 to 2; and 
assign equal probability of 1/3 to each. However if we redescribe the problem in terms of the 
ratio of water to wine, we end up assigning equal probability of 1/3 to the intervals water to wine 
(a’) 1/2 to 1, (b’) 1 to 1 1/2, (c’) 1 1/2 to 2. Now the interval (a) describes the same outcome as 
the disjunction (b’) v (c’). So we assign probability 1/3 to the disjunction (b’) v (c’) and also to 
each of its parts. 
24 Contingent propositions are defined here as propositions that may be either true of false. 
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 The second instrument used to delineate the epistemic state of complete ignorance is the 
notion of invariance, used so effectively by objective Bayesians, but here used in a way that 
objective Bayesians may not endorse. The notion ultimately produces serious problems for 
Bayesian confirmation theory. The greater our ignorance, the more symmetries we have under 
which the epistemic state should be invariant. It is quite easy to accumulate so many symmetries 
that the epistemic state cannot be a probability distribution. For example, let us say we know 
only 
x is a real number the interval (0,1).                                  (DATUM) 
This information (DATUM) remains true if x is replaced by x’ = 1-x, where the function x’(x) is 
self-inverting. It also remains true if x is replaced by x’’ = 1 – (1 – (1-x)2)1/2, where once again 
the function x’’(x) is self-inverting. So our epistemic state must remain unchanged under each of 
these transformations. It is easy to show that no probability distribution can be invariant under 
both. (See Norton, forthcoming b, §3.2) 
 Invariance requirements can be used to pick out the unique state of complete ignorance, 
which turns out to be (I) above. To see the relevant invariance, consider some proposition A over 
whose truth we may be completely ignorant. Our belief would be unchanged were A replaced by 
~A.25 That is, the state of complete ignorance remains unchanged under a transformation that 
replaces every contingent proposition with its negation. It can readily be seen that the ignorance 
distribution (I) satisfies this invariance requirement. Each contingent proposition and its negation 
are assigned the same degree Ig.26 That this ignorance distribution (I) is the only distribution 
                                                
25 Describing this transformation more figuratively makes the invariance intuitive. Imagine that 
the content of proposition A has been written in a normal English sentence by a scribe on a slip 
of paper, folded before us on the table. We form our belief over the truth of the sentence on the 
paper: it is complete ignorance because we have no idea what the sentence says. We are now told 
that the scribe erred and mistakenly wrote the content of ~A on the paper instead. That new 
information would not change our belief state at all. 
26 It is assumed that the ignorance does not extend to logical truths, so that we know which 
propositions are assuredly true and false and we assign Max and Min to them. We could define a 
broader ignorance state in which logical truths are presumed unknown as well by assigning the 
same value Ig to all propositions. 
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satisfying this invariance that we are likely to encounter is made more precise by the 
demonstration that it is the only monotonic27 distribution of belief with the requisite invariance 
(Norton, forthcoming b, §6). 
 The negation map--the transformation that replaces each contingent proposition with its 
negation--is a little more complicated than it may initially seem. To see the difficulty, imagine 
that the outcome space is exhausted by n mutually exclusive atomic propositions, A1, A2, … , 
An. The transformation replaces atomic propositions, such as A1 by compound propositions, 
such as A2vA3v … vAn, so it may not be evident that the transformation is a symmetry of the 
outcome space. It is, in the sense that it maps the outcome space back to itself and is self-
inverting; A2vA3v … vAn is mapped to A1. However, it does not preserve additive measures. 
The transformation takes an additive measure m to what Norton (forthcoming a) describes as a 
“dual additive measure” M. These dual additive measures have properties that are, on first 
acquaintance, odd looking. They are additive, but their additivity is attached to conjunctions. If 
we have propositions A and B such that AvB is always true, then we can add their measures as 
M(A&B) = M(A) + M(B). The notion of a dual measure allows a simple characterization of the 
ignorance distribution (I): it is the unique, monotonic measure that is self-dual. 
 If one does not see that an epistemic state of complete ignorance is represented by the 
non-probabilistic (I), one is susceptible to the “inductive disjunctive fallacy” (Norton, manuscript 
c). Let a1, a2, a3, … be a large number of mutually exclusive outcomes over which we are in 
complete ignorance. According to (I), we remain in that state of complete ignorance for any 
contingent disjunction of these outcomes, a1v a2v a3v … If one applies probabilities 
thoughtlessly, one might try to represent the state of complete ignorance by a broadly spread 
probability distribution over the outcomes. Then the probability of the disjunction can be brought  
close to unity merely by adding more outcomes. Hence one would infer fallaciously to near 
certainty for a sufficiently large contingent disjunction of outcomes over which we are 
individually in complete ignorance. The fallacy is surprisingly widespread. A striking example is 
supplied by van Inwagen (1996) in answer to the cosmic question “Why is there anything at all?” 
                                                
27 A distribution of belief “degree (.)” is monotonic if, whenever A logically entails B, degree 
(A) ≤ degree (B). 
26 
There is, he asserts, one way for no thing to be, but infinitely many ways for different things to 
be. Distributing probabilities over these outcomes fairly uniformly, we infer that the disjunction 
representing the infinitely many ways things can be must attract all the probability mass so that 
we assign probability one to it. 
4.4 Bayesian Responses 
 The literature in Bayesian confirmation theory has long grappled with this problem of 
representing ignorance. That is especially so for prior probability distributions, where the 
presumption that ignorance must be representable is most pressing. Perhaps the most satisfactory 
response comes through the basic supposition of subjective Bayesians that the probabilities are 
subjective and may vary from person to person as long as the axioms of the probability calculus 
are respected. So the necessary deviation from the non-probabilistic ignorance distribution (I) in 
some agent’s prior probability distribution is discounted as an individual aberration not reflecting 
the true evidential situation. The price paid in adopting this response, the injection of subjectivity 
and necessity of every prior being aberrant, is too high a price for objective Bayesians, who are 
committed to there being one probability distribution appropriate for each circumstance. 
 However objective Bayesian methods have not proven able to deliver true “ignorance 
priors,” even though the term does appear over-optimistically in the objective Bayesian literature 
(Jaynes, 2003, Ch.12). One approach is to identify the ignorance priors by invariance properties. 
That meets only with limited success, since greater ignorance generates more invariances and, as 
we saw in Section 4.3 above, eventually there are so many invariances that no probability 
measure is admissible. An alternative approach is to seek ignorance priors in distributions of 
maximum entropy.28 Maximum entropy distributions do supply what are, in an intuitive sense, 
the most uniform distributions admissible. If, for example, we have an outcome space 
comprising n atomic propositions, without further constraints, the maximum entropy distribution 
is the one uniform distribution that assigns probability 1/n to each atomic proposition. However, 
if there is sufficient ignorance, there will be invariances under which the property of having 
attainted maximum entropy will not be preserved. In the end, it is inevitable that these methods 
cannot deliver the ignorance distribution (I), for (I) is not a probability distribution. So the best 
                                                
28 For further objections to maximum entropy methods, see Seidenfeld (1979). 
27 
that can be expected is that they will deliver a distribution that captures ignorance over one 
aspect of the problem, but not all. The tendency in the literature now is to replace the misleading 
terminology of “ignorance prior” by more neutral terms such as “noninformative priors,” 
“reference priors” or, most clearly “priors constructed by some formal rule” (Kass and 
Wasserman, 1996). 
 Another popular approach to representing ignorance with Bayesian confirmation theory is 
to allow that an agent’s epistemic state is not given by any one probability measure, but by a set 
of them, possibly convex. (See for example Levi (1980, Ch. 9).) The deepest concern with this 
strategy is that it amounts to an attempt to simulate the failure of additivity that is associated with 
the representation of ignorance. Something like the complete ignorance state (I) can be 
simulated, for example, by taking the set of all probability measures over the same outcome 
space. The resulting structure is vastly more complicated than (I), the state it tries to simulate. It 
has become non-local in the sense that a single ignorance value is no longer attributed to an 
outcome. Each of the many probabilities assigned to some outcome must be interpreted in the 
context of the other values assigned to other propositions and in cognizance that there are many 
other distributions in the set.29 
 Finally, as pointed out in Norton (forthcoming a, b), a set of probability measures 
necessarily falls short of simulating (I). For no set of additive measures can have the requisite 
invariance property of a complete ignorance state—invariance under the negation map. For a set 
of additive measures is transformed by the negation map into a set of dual additive measures. In 
informal terms, any set of additive measures on an outcome space preserves a directedness. For 
each measure in the set, as one proceeds from the assuredly false proposition to the assuredly 
true by taking disjunctions, the measures assigned are non-decreasing and must, at some point, 
increase strictly. Invariance under the negation map precludes such directedness. 
4.5 Ignorance over a Countable Infinity of Outcomes 
 The difficulties of representing ignorance have been explored in the literature in some 
detail in the particular problem of identifying a state of ignorance over a countable infinity of 
                                                
29 For a discussion of convex sets of probability measures and the how they contain the Shafer 
Dempster belief functions as a special case, see Kyburg (1987). 
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outcomes. It has driven Bayesians to some extreme proposals none of which appear able to 
handle the problem in its most intractable form. 30 
 The traditional starting place—already “well-known” when de Finetti (1972, p.86) 
outlined it-- is to determine our beliefs concerning a natural number “chosen at random.” Its 
more figurative version is “de Finetti’s Lottery” (Bartha 2004) in which a lottery ticket is picked 
at random from a countable infinity of tickets. If we write the prior probability for numbers 1, 2, 
3, … as p1, p2, p3, …, we cannot reconcile two conditions. First, since we have no preference for 
any number over any other, we assign the same probability to each number 
pi  =  pk      all i, k 
Second, the sum of all probabilities must be unity 
p1 + p2 + p3 +…  =  1                                                      (CA) 
No set of values for pi can satisfy both conditions.31 
 De Finetti’s own solution was to note that the condition (CA), “countable additivity” (as 
applied to this example), is logically stronger than finite additivity (A). The latter applies only to 
a finite set of outcomes—say, that the number chosen is a number in {1, 2, … , n}. It asserts that 
                                                
30 The problem of ignorance over a countable infinity of outcomes is actually no worse than the 
corresponding problem with a continuum outcome space. The latter problem contains the former 
in that a continuum outcome space can be partitioned into a countable infinity of subsets. 
Perhaps the countable case is deemed more problematic since outcomes can still be counted so it 
appears (incorrectly) that there will be a unique, natural probability measure recoverable from 
ratios of counts. In the continuum case, no such illusions are possible. The continuum case is 
more problematic in the sense that in it non-zero probabilities cannot be assigned to individual 
outcomes. Instead a probability density is used to assign probabilities to certain sets of outcomes. 
That presumes the outcome space has a topology that admits an additive measure. This device of 
a probability density becomes harder to use as the outcome space becomes larger. If the space 
consists of all real numbers, then the only uniform probability density is an improper density that 
cannot be normalized to unity. 
31 Let p = pi = pk, then p1 + p2 + p3 + …  = 0 or ∞, according to whether p is zero or non-zero, 
both of which contradict (CA). 
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the probability of this finite set is the finite sum p1 + p2 + p3 +… + pn. Condition (CA) adds the 
requirement that this relation continues to hold in the limit of n→∞. De Finetti asserted that the 
probability distribution representing our epistemic state in this problem need only be finitely 
additive, not countably additive. That allows us to set pi = 0 for all i, without forcing the 
probability of infinite sets of outcomes to be zero. So if odd = {1, 3, 5, …} and even = {2, 4, 6, 
…} we can still set P(odd) = P(eve) = 0.5. 
 Solving the problem by dropping countable additivity has proven to be a popular and 
well-understood solution. While proponents of the restriction to finite additivity are typically not 
frequentists (who identify probabilities with relative frequencies), the connection to frequentism 
is natural. The frequency of any particular natural number among all is zero and the frequency of 
even numbers is 1/2, in a naturally defined limit. Kadane and O’Hagan (1995) have mapped out 
which uniform, finitely additive probability distributions are possible over the natural numbers, 
noting how these are delimited by natural conditions such as agreement with limiting frequencies 
and invariance of probability under translation of a set of numbers. There are also variant forms 
of the proposal, such as the use of Popper functions and the notion of “relative probability” 
(Bartha, and Johns, 2001, Bartha, 2004). However dropping countable additivity is not without 
disadvantages and enthusiasm for it is not universal. There are Dutch book arguments that favor 
countable additivity; and important limit theorems, including Bayesian convergence of opinion 
theorems, depend upon countable additivity. See Williamson (1999), Howson and Urbach (2006, 
pp. 26-29) and Kelly (1996, Ch. 13).32 Other approaches explore the possibility of assigning 
infinitesimally small probabilities to what would otherwise be zero probability outcomes. 
(McGee, 1994). 
 While all these solutions come at some cost, they are eventually unavailing. For they 
have not addressed the problem in its most acute form. They deal only with the case of ignorance 
                                                
32 To someone with an interest in physics, where probabilities are routinely summed over 
infinitely many outcomes, the restriction to finite additivity appears ruinous to ordinary physical 
theorizing. Countable additivity is hidden in many places. It is presumed whenever we normalize 

















over natural numbers, where this set of a countable infinity of outcomes has a natural order. If 
we presume that we know of no such natural order, then all these solutions fail, as has been 
shown in a paradox reported by Bartha (2004, §5.1) and in the work of Arntzenius (manuscript). 
 Imagine that we have a countable infinity of outcomes with no way to order them. If we 
have some labeling of the outcomes by natural numbers, that numbering is completely 
arbitrary.33 Let us pick some arbitrary labeling of the outcomes, 1, 2, 3, …, and seek an 
ignorance distribution over these labels. That ignorance distribution should be unaffected by any 
one-to-one relabeling of the outcomes; that is, the ignorance distribution is invariant under a 
permutation of the labels, for permutations are a symmetry of this system. Consider the outcomes 
odd = {1, 3, 5, …} and even = {2, 4, 6, …}. There is a permutation that simply switches the 
labels of the two sets (1↔2, 3↔4, 5↔6, …), so that outcomes in each set are exchanged. Since 
our belief distribution is invariant under such a permutation, it follows that the permutation does 
not alter our belief and we must have the same belief in each outcome set odd and even. Now 
consider the four outcome sets 
one = {1, 5, 9, 13, …} = {4i + 1: i = 0, 1, 2, 3, …} 
two = {2, 6, 10, 14, …} = {4i + 2: i = 0, 1, 2, 3, …} 
three = {3, 7, 11, 15, …} = {4i + 3: i = 0, 1, 2, 3, …} 
three = {4, 8, 12, 16, …} = {4i + 4: i = 0, 1, 2, 3, …} 
There is a permutation that switches labels of one and two; so we have equal belief in one and 
two. Proceeding pairwise through the sets, we find we must have equal belief in each of one, two, 
three and four. Now there is also a pairwise permutation that switches the labels of one with 
those of two ∪ three ∪ four, where 
two ∪ three ∪ four = {2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, …} 
It is just the obvious permutation read off the above sets 
1↔2, 5↔3, 9↔4, 13↔6, 17↔7, 21↔8, … 
                                                
33 For a concrete example, imagine that an infinite space is partitioned into a countable infinity 
of geometrically identical cubes and that our cosmology tells us that a single hydrogen atom will 
appear in one of them without favoring any one of them. We arbitrarily labeling the cubes as 1, 
2, 3,  …. 
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So we now infer that we must have the same belief in one as in two ∪ three ∪ four. Combining 
we find: we must have the same belief in two ∪ three ∪ four and in each of its disjunctive parts 
two, three and four. This requirement cannot be met by a probability distribution for it 
contradicts (finite) additivity.34 It is however compatible with the ignorance distribution (I). 
 Finally, it is sometimes remarked that the very idea of uniform ignorance over a 
countable set is somehow illicit for there is no mechanical contrivance that could select outcomes 
so that they have equal chances. No lottery commission could build a device that would 
implement the de Finetti lottery. For references to these concerns, see Bartha, 2004, pp. 304-305, 
who correctly objects that the inevitable non-unformity of probabilities of the lottery machine 
does not force non-uniformity of beliefs. What needs to be added is that the entire objection is 
based on a circularity. In it, the notion of a mechanical contrivance tacitly supposes a contrivance 
whose outcomes are governed by a probability distribution. So it amounts to saying that no 
machine whose outcomes are governed by a probability distribution can generate outcomes 
governed by a non-probabilistic distribution. Recent work in philosophy of physics has identified 
idealized physical mechanisms that produce indeterministic outcomes that are not governed by a 
probability distribution. An example is the “dome,” described in Norton (2007, §8.3; 
manuscript), where it is shown that the dome’s outcomes are governed by a non-probabilistic 
distribution with the same structure as (I). There are many more examples of these sorts of 
indeterministic systems in the “supertask” literature. (For a survey, see Laraudogoitia, 2004.) 
Many of these mechanisms conform with Newtonian mechanics, but depend on idealizations 
some find “unphysical” for their distinctive behavior.35 These processes could be the physical 
basis of an idealized contrivance that implements something like the de Finetti lottery. 
                                                
34 Another possibility is the improper probability distribution that assigns some small probability 
ε to each, individual outcome and infinite probability to the total outcome space. This improper 
distribution is badly behaved under conditionalization. For example P(2|even) = 0, not ε/2; and 
P(two|even) = ∞/∞ = undefined, not 1/2. 
35 For an analysis of the notion of “physical” in this context and the suggestion that we discount 
these concerns, see Norton (manuscript a). 
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5. Bayesian Dynamics 
5.1 The Property: Refute and Rescale 
 The properties investigated so far—framework and additivity—are essential to Bayesian 
confirmation theory. However we are still missing the essential part of the theory from which its 
name is derived. For so far, we have no means to relate probability measures conditioned on 
different propositions, so that we cannot yet relate the posterior probability P(H|E) of some 
hypothesis H conditioned on evidence E with its prior probability P(H) =P(H|B), for some 
background B. (Here and henceforth, for notational convenience, “P(A)” will be written as 
shorthand for “P(A|B)”, for some assumed background B.) 
 These means for relating prior and posterior probabilities are supplied by two properties. 
The first property is “narrowness” and asserts for any A and C that 
P(A&C|C) = P(A|C)                                                                (N) 
The second property is “multiplication,” which asserts for any A and C that 
P(A&C) = P(A&C|C).P(C) = P(C&A|A).P(C)                                           (M) 
These properties combined entail36 
P(A|C) = P(A&C)/P(C) 
when P(C) is not zero. That this formula arises through compounding the two properties (N) and 
(M) is not generally reported. That compounding is important in the discussion that follows, 
since these two properties make distinct assertions in the context of confirmation theory and 
require separate analysis. 
 These two properties (N) and (M) can also be combined to yield Bayes’ theorem. For 
hypothesis H and evidence E: 
P(H&E) = P(H&E|E).P(E) = P(H|E).P(E) 
= P(E&H) = P(E&H|H).P(H) = P(E|H).P(H) 
so that when P(E) is not zero we have Bayes’ theorem 
                                                
36 The combined formula is sometimes regarded as the definition of conditional probability in 
terms of unconditional probability. That view is not taken here since P(A) is not unconditional, 
but shorthand for P(A|B).Hájek (2003) has objected that this candidate definition fails to yield an 
everywhere serviceable notion of conditional probability. 
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! 
P(H | E) =
P(E | H )
P(E)
P(H )                                                         (B) 
It tells us how learning evidence E should lead us to update our beliefs, as expressed in the 
transition from the prior P(H) to the posterior probability P(H|E). 
 Bayes’ theorem embodies a very simple model of belief dynamics whose two steps 
essentially correspond to the two properties (N) and (M) above. 
Refute. When evidence E is learned, those parts of the hypothesis H logically 
incompatible with the evidence are discarded as irrelevant to the bearing of evidence. 
That is, the hypothesis H has two parts in relation to evidence E: H = (H&E) v (H&~E). 
The second part (H&~E) is that part which is refuted by E. The first part (H&E) is the 
part of H that entails E. H can only accrue support through this part, since we have from 
(N) that P(H|E) = P(H&E|E).  
Rescale. The import of evidence E on competing hypotheses H, H’, … is then simply the 
prior probability P(H&E), P(H’&E), … of those parts of the hypotheses logically 
compatible with the evidence, linearly rescaled so as to preserve normalization to unity; 





P(H & E | E)
P(H '&E | E)
=
P(E | H & E).P(H & E)





since P(E|H&E) = 1 = P(E|H’&E). 
A figurative model of this dynamics underscore its very great simplicity. In his “muddy Venn 
diagram,” Van Fraassen’s (1990. p. 161-62) pictures the total outcome space as a surface, such 
as a table top, and the degrees of belief assigned to outcome sets are represented by volumes of 
mud piled over the areas corresponding to each outcome. Conditionalization on evidence E 
occurs in two steps, as shown in Figure 1. First (“refute”), all the mud piled outside E is carefully 
swept away. Second (“rescale”), that swept-away mud is redeposited on E in such a way that the 
proportions in the contours over E are retained.37 
                                                
37 For example, if the mud is twice as high at one spot in relation to another prior to the 
redepositing of the mud, it will be piled twice as high after, as well. 
34 
 
Figure 1. Muddy Venn diagram illustrates rescale and refute dynamics 
 
 It is informally evident that this qualitative notion of refute and rescale dynamics captures 
the essence of Bayesian dynamics. That informal idea has been made more precise in Norton 
(2007, §4), where the dependencies of refute and rescale dynamics are used to generate an axiom 
system for degrees, which turn out to be ordinary probabilities up to monotonic rescalings. 
5.2 Non- Bayesian Shifts 
 Under refute and rescale dynamics, the import of evidence is always to modify prior 
beliefs. Earman (1992, pp. 195-198) and Brown (1996) state the obvious difficulty. The 
dynamics cannot apply if there is no prior belief since the hypothesis or outcome in question is 
not in the outcome space. Just such a circumstance occurs at decisive moments in the history of 
science. At moments of rapid change—best known through Thomas Kuhn’s notion of a scientific 
revolution—the inconceivable becomes conceivable and, we are told, that evidence compels us 
to believe it. When Einstein proposed his special theory of relativity in 1905, he urged that there 
is no absolute fact as to whether spatially separated events are simultaneous; the simultaneity of 
events depends upon the inertial reference frame from which they are assessed. That notion was 
regarded as bizarre by Einstein’s critics, many of whom continued to refuse to take it seriously 
long after 1905. Another example is Bohr’s theory of the atom of 1913. That theory seemed to 
require commitment to an inconsistency: in different processes, accelerated electrons bound in an 
atom would be supposed to radiate, as classical electrodynamics required, or would be supposed 
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not to radiate, in contradiction with classical electrodynamics, according to which supposition 
was expedient for the recovery of the results Bohr needed. 
 Closely connected to the problem of outcomes not in the space are those to which it is 
natural to assign zero probability. A logical inconsistency, such as Bohr’s theory, is a natural 
candidate. It follows immediately from Bayes’ theorem that, once we have assigned a zero prior 
probability to any hypothesis, conditionalization cannot change its probability from zero. The 
only recovery is to reassign a non-zero probability to the hypothesis by a process that contradicts 
Bayes’ theorem. 
 We might discount as rarities these inversions of what is conceivable and the oddity of 
accepting inconsistencies as established law. However even if they are rarities, they are 
important rarities that reappear throughout the history of our science and cannot be neglected by 
a comprehensive account of scientific rationality. The natural Bayesian rejoinder is to protest that 
too much is being asked of it. The formation of new outcome spaces belongs to Reichenbach’s 
context of discovery. Bayesian confirmation theory, indeed any logic at all, cannot be 
responsible both for logical relations among propositions and also for the discovery methods 
used to create new outcome spaces. 
5.3 Is Bayes’ Theorem Sensitive Enough to the Connections between 
Evidence and Theory? 
 The simplicity of refute and rescale dynamics invites the next challenge: the dynamics is 
too simple and too insensitive to the ways that evidence and theory can relate. 
5.3.1 Problems Arising from “Refute….” 
 The first “refute” step of Bayesian conditionalization depends essentially on the idea that 
the disjunctive part of H  = (H&E) v (H&~E) that extends beyond the total evidence E, that is 
H&~E, does not affect the bearing of evidence E on H. That is, “narrowness” directly asserts that 
P(H|E) = P(H&E|E). While this idea is so familiar as generally to pass without comment, it does 
represent a blindness in Bayesian confirmation theory. As an illustration of it, imagine that we 
seek to identify some animal. Our evidence is that it is a bird. What support does that evidence 
lend to the possibility that the animal is a canary or, alternatively, a canary or a whale? 
Narrowness asserts that it lends the same support: 
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P(canary or whale | bird) = P(canary | bird) 
In some scenarios, this can make sense. As we check instances of birds, we will find the 
frequency of “canary or whale” to arise exactly as often as “canary.” If these frequencies are all 
that matters, then we would say the two outcomes are equally supported. However few would 
halt there. We would discount the “whale” disjunct as a nuisance embellishment that should be 
dismissed as a distraction precisely because it is deductively refuted by the evidence “bird.” The 
frequency count just mentioned is blind to its nuisance character in so far as it assigns the same 
frequency of success to “canary” as to “canary or whale.” 
 It is possible to devise a logic that is sensitive to this problem and punishes an hypothesis 
in the degree that it extends beyond the evidence. An example38 is the “specific conditioning” 
logic defined in Norton (manuscript b, Section 10.2). In a formulation compatible with 
developments here, the logic amounts to a new definition for the conditional probability P(H|E). 
It starts with an additive measure P(.) on the background and defines the alternative 
PSC(H|E)  =  P(H&E)2/(P(E).P(H))   =   P(H&E)/(P(E) . P(H&E)/(P(H)                       (SC) 
This alternative rule of conditionalization rewards hypotheses H with more support the closer 
they come to the total evidence E = (E and background)—hence the term “specific 
conditioning.” PSC(H|E) = 1 only when H=E excepting measure zero differences. H can differ 
from E in two ways and the logic of (SC) penalizes it for both. In the first way, H can fail to 
exhaust E in measure. Then the first factor of (SC), that is, P(H&E)/(P(E), is less than one 
(which alone would correspond to the usual case of Bayesian conditionalization). In the second 
way, H can extend beyond E in measure. Then the second factor of (SC), that is P(H&E)/(P(H), 
is less than one. Deviations in both ways are penalized equally and it turns out that this is 
expressed in a striking symmetry in PSC. That is PSC(H|E)  =  PSC(E|H). 
                                                
38 Specific conditioning resembles some of the measures of incremental support that have been 
investigated in the Bayesian literature, such as the ratio measure r(H,E) = P(H|E)/P(H) = 
P(H&E)/(P(E).P(H)). (See Eels and Fitelson, 2002.) These incremental measures seek only to 
identify how much support is accorded specifically by evidence E. The conditional probability 
P(H|E) is still taken as the measure of support for the total evidence E = (E and background), 
which includes E. PSC(.|E) seeks to measure the support from the total evidence that includes E. 
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 Returning to the bird example, with plausible values for PSC(.), we will have 
PSC(canary or whale | bird) < PSC(canary | bird) 
Indeed we will have 
PSC(canary or whale | canary) < PSC(canary | canary) = 1 
That is, even though “canary” deductively entails “canary or whale,” the latter is not accorded 
full support from “canary.” The logic of (SC) judges “canary or whale” to be supported less 
specifically by the evidence “canary.” In the case of Bayesian confirmation theory, evidence 
accords unit support to any of its deductive consequences, no matter how much they are 
weakened logically. PSC reduces the support accorded to these deductive consequences 
according to how much they are weakened logically. 
5.3.2 Problems Arising from “…Rescale” 
 In the special case in which they hypothesis H deductively entails the evidence E, the first 
“refute” step of Bayesian conditionalization is not invoked and the process reduces to rescaling 
only by means of the property “multiplication” (M). This special case provides a means of 
isolating the second step and plumbing its problems. 
 Consider two hypotheses H and H’ both of which entail the evidence E. In that case, it 
follows from Bayes’ theorem that the ratio of the posterior probabilities P(H|E)/P(H’|E) is the 
same as the ratio of the priors. It now follows that the incremental confirmation, as measured by 
the ratio of posterior and prior P(H|E)/P(H), is the same in both cases. That is, when two 
hypotheses both entail the same true evidence, they get the same confirmatory boost. In 
particular, if H is more probable than, less probable than or just as probable as H’ prior to 
conditionalization, it will remain so afterwards. 
 This failure to separate H and H’ evidentially, according to critics, is to overlook that 
their entailments of the evidence E can differ in more subtle qualities that have epistemic import. 
For example, recall efforts in the late 19th century to detect the earth’s motion through the 
luminiferous ether. These experiments yielded a null result (E). We may entertain two 
hypotheses: 
H: There is no ether state of rest against which the earth can move. 
H’: There is an ether state of rest but we happen to be motionless with respect to it each 
time the experiments are performed. 
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Each of H and H’ entail the evidence E, but it seems wrong that both should receive the same 
support from E. H succeeds, as it were, by honest toil; but H’ by theft. There are many ways that 
this metaphor of honest toil and theft is explicated. 
 One way notes that H succeeds because it explains why the experiments yielded null 
results, where as H’ does not. Considerations like this lead Achinstein (2001, Ch. 7) to argue that 
it is not sufficient to count as evidence that some datum incrementally increases the probability 
of an hypothesis or that the probability of the hypothesis conditioned on the datum is high.39 In 
addition there must be an explanatory connection. 
 Other approaches are variants of this idea that some successful entailments are virtuous 
and others not. The hypothesis H makes the prediction that all ether current experiments will fail 
and that prediction is verified by the evidence. Since H’ supposes that it is by happenstance that 
we were at rest in the ether just at the moment of the experiments, H’ simply accommodates the 
evidence in the sense that it has been adjusted to accommodate experimental reports at hand. 
Predictions, for example, are virtuous and their success merits an increase in belief; 
accommodations are not virtuous and are epistemically inert. See Horwich (1982, Ch. 5) for 
discussion and an argument that we should not differentially reward prediction and 
accommodation. Another way of expressing these concerns is to note that H’ (but not H) was 
cooked up “ad hoc” specifically to match the evidence. A classic example is the creationist 
hypothesis that the world was created in 4004 BC, complete with a fossil record that perfectly 
simulates a more ancient, evolutionary past. It is an evidential truism that such ad hoc hypotheses 
gain no support from the observations they accommodate. For an account of how ad hoc 
hypotheses can be treated in a Bayesian context, see Howson and Urbach (2006, pp. 121-126), 
who also suggest that sometimes there are “good” ad hoc hypotheses that deserve support. 
 The literature on these evidential virtues in Bayesian confirmation theory is large and 
convoluted. In general, however, there are two broad strategies that Bayesian confirmation 
theory can employ when faced with a virtuous and non-virtuous pair of hypotheses. The first is 
to expand the outcome space so that there are more resources available to pick the hypotheses 
                                                
39 See Achinstein (2001, Ch.7 and passim) for numerous examples. For example, learning that 
most lottery tickets were unsold may increase greatly my belief that mine is the winning ticket, 
even though the absolute probability may remain small. See also Laudan (1997). 
39 
apart.40 That risks merely postponing the problem since it may now return for another pair of 
hypotheses in the larger space. The second is to use prior probabilities to reward virtuous 
hypotheses and punish non-virtuous ones. That is, since the ratio of the posterior probabilities 
P(H|E)/P(H’|E) equals the ratio of the priors P(H)/P(H’), we may reward the explanatory, 
predictive or non-ad hoc H by making the ratio P(H)/P(H’) very large, so that there is a 
corresponding advantage for H in the posterior probabilities. As observed in Norton (2007, 
§5.3.3), this use of prior probabilities requires a curious prescience: we are to penalize the prior 
probability of an ad hoc hypothesis in advance in just the right degree so that the punishment 
perfectly cancels the as yet unknown confirmatory reward that will be accorded to the 
hypotheses by Bayes’ theorem. Further, prior probabilities for hypotheses or theories are 
assigned once, globally, whereas virtues are manifested locally and may differ from domain to 
domain. So we may find a theory explanatory in one domain and want to reward it with a high 
prior probability; but may find it explanatorily deficient in another, and may want to punish it 
with a low prior probability. 
5.4 The Likelihood Theory of Evidence” and “Likelihoodism” 
 The above discussion has dealt with the case of hypotheses that entail the evidence. 
Matters are slightly more complicated when the hypothesis only makes the evidence more or less 
probable. In that case, Bayes’ theorem allows us to compare the import of evidence E for two 





P(E | H )
P(E | H ' )
P(H )
P(H ' )
                                                   (B’) 
It follows that the relative import of the evidence E is fully determined by the two likelihoods, 
P(E|H) and P(E|H’). For the ratio of the prior probabilities P(H)/P(H’) reflects our comparative 
belief in H and H’ prior to any consideration of evidence E; the ratio of the posteriors 
P(H|E)/P(H|E’) reflects our comparative belief in H and H’ after the import of evidence E has 
                                                
40 For example Maher treats prediction and accommodation by supposing that hypotheses are 
generated by methods that may or may not have certain items of evidence available to them 
when they generate the hypotheses. He then shifts assessment to the credibility of the methods. 
See Achinstein (2001, pp. 215-221) for discussion. 
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been accommodated. The ratio of the likelihoods P(E|H)/P(E|H’) is what takes us from the  ratio 
of the prior to the ratio of the posteriors. Therefore, it expresses the relative import of evidence E 
on these two hypotheses. 
 That the likelihoods capture all needed information for evaluating the bearing of evidence 
is the core notion of a “likelihood theory of evidence.” (In the special case in which the 
hypotheses entail the evidence, P(E|H) = P(E|H’) = 1. Then the ratio of the posteriors equals the 
ratio of the priors and E cannot discriminate evidentially between H and H’.)  
 Since so many of the problems of Bayesian confirmation theory focus on prior 
probabilities, an attractive modification to the theory is a view that excises prior probabilities but 
leaves the rest intact. The view, popularly known as “likelihoodism,” has been advocated by 
Edwards (1972) and Royall (1997). As we have just seen, in Bayes’ theorem (B’), the evidence E 
favors the hypothesis H over H’ just in the ratio of their likelihoods, P(E|H)/P(E|H’). The 
proposal is that this consequence of Bayes’ theorem be extracted and elevated to an independent 
principle, the “law of likelihood.” The judgment of evidential import is always comparative—
evidence favors this hypothesis more or less than that—and the troublesome prior probabilities 
never need enter. 
 The principal difficulty for likelihoodism is that it faces all the problems of the Bayesian 
refute and rescale dynamics recounted here, but without the resources of prior probabilities to 
ameliorate them. In particular, likelihoodists must say that evidence entailed by two hypotheses 
is equally favorable to both hypotheses no matter what their virtues or vices. For likelihoodists 
have lost the Bayesian mechanism of using prior probabilities to reward simpler hypotheses or 
ones with anticipated predictive power and to penalize ad hoc or contrived hypotheses. Royall 
(1997, §1.7) considers and offers likelihoodist rejoinders to such concerns. 
5.5 Model Selection, Prediction and Simplicity 
 While the notion that the likelihoods capture the incremental import of evidence has 
enjoyed notable successes, its overall history has been troubled. There are recalcitrant cases in 
which the likelihoods alone are clearly too coarse a measure of the import of evidence. 
Likelihood rewards only accuracy in fitting data at hand. It has difficulty accommodating our 
common preference for simpler hypotheses that may be less accurate. In rewarding fit to the data 
at hand, likelihood may be a weaker guide to the greater truth sought that extends beyond these 
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data; that is, likelihood tends to favor accommodation to present data as opposed to predictive 
success with future data. 
 The familiar and long-standing illustration of these difficulties comes in the problem of 
curve fitting. Let us say that we wish to find the relationship between variables x and y. We have 
measured values of x and y:41 
<x1,y1> = <0.7, 1.0>,    <x2,y2> = <1.5, 1.8>,    <x3,y3> = <2.1, 2.0>,     …,         (DATA) 
which are shown on the graph of Figure 2 below. Our presumption is that these data were 
generated by the relation 
yi  =  f(xi) + errori 
where errori is a random error term affecting the i-th pair of x-y values. (It is common to assume 
that these error terms are normally distributed and independent of one another.) The goal of our 
analysis is identification of the function f(x). The standard method is to find that function that 
generates a curve of best fit to the data. For data such as in Figure 2, we would normally seek a 
straight line. That is, we would assume that the unknown function is linear, so that the data was 
generated by 
yi  =  A + Bxi + errori                                                 (LIN) 
That straight line turns out to be 
yi  =  -0.332 + 0.997xi + errori                                  (LINbest) 
The straight line LINbest is the best fit to the data in the sense that it is the straight line drawn 
from LIN that makes the DATA most probable. That is, its values of A and B maximize the 
likelihood P(DATA | LINbest); and A = -0.332  and B = 0.997 are the “maximum likelihood 
estimators” of A and B. 
 
                                                
41 The full data set is <0.7, 1.0>, <1.5, 1.8>, <2.1, 2.0>, <2.3, 0.6>, <2.6, 1.0>, <3.8, 2.1>, <4.5, 
3.1>, <4.7, 6.0>, <5.6, 6.9>, <5.6, 7.7>, <5.8, 4.9>, <6.2, 4.4>, <7.1, 7.7>, <7.6, 6.7>, <8.8, 
10.1>, <8.9, 8.2>, <9.1, 8.1>, <9.3, 7.4> 
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Figure 2. Linear and cubic curves of best fit. 
 
 The complication is that we can find other functions f(x) that fit the data more closely and 
make it even more probable. Consider, for example, cubic functions 
yi  =  A + Bxi + Cxi2 + Dxi3 + errori                                                 (CUB) 
The particular cubic plotted in Figure 2 against the background of the same data, 
yi  =  1.952 - 1.377xi + 0.581xi2 – 0.0389xi3 + errori                            (CUBbest) 
maximizes the likelihood P(DATA | CUBbest). 
 As one can see from comparing the two curves visually, the cubic CUBbest fits the data 
more closely that the linear LINbest and it turns out that  
P(DATA | CUBbest)   >   P(DATA | LINbest) 
Therefore, according to the likelihood theory of evidence, we should conclude that the data better 
supports the cubic CUBbest over the linear LINbest. 
 It is evident from a cursory scan of the data that this is most likely a mistake. Whatever 
trend f(x) may be embodied within the data, it is heavily confounded by noise from the error 
term. While the data definitely gives us warrant to believe that f(x) is an increasing function of x, 
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we have no warrant for the specifics of the cubic CUBbest.42 We should be much more modest in 
what we infer from data this noisy. The better fit of the cubic CUBbest has been achieved by the 
greater ability of a cubic to conform to random fluctuations from the trend induced by noise; that 
is, the curve is “overfitted.” This overfitting is most evident around x=1, where the curve 
reverses direction; and again around x=9, where the curve also reverses direction. Given the 
sparsity and scattering of the data, cubic CUBbest is merely tracking noise at these places, 
whereas the linear LINbest is responding to a real increase with x in the trend. 
 The informal discussion of the last paragraph captures the practical thinking of curve 
fitting. It is grounded tacitly in the considerations of simplicity and prediction at issue here. We 
know that we can always find a curve that fits the data better by looking to more complicated 
functional forms, such as higher order polynomials. However, at some stage, we judge that we 
should prefer the simpler curve over the more complicated one that fits the data better. The 
reason is that our interests extend beyond the narrow problem of finding a curve the merely fits 
this particular data set well. Our data is only a sample of many more values of x and y; and we 
are interested in finding a function f(x) that will also fit these other as yet unseen values. That is, 
our goal is to find a function f(x) that will support prediction. We expect that we can best achieve 
that goal by forgoing some accuracy of fit with the present data of an overfitted curve in favor of 
a simpler functional form for f(x) that will enable future data to be fitted better. For an overfitted 
curve responds to random noise whose specific patterns of deviations will probably not reappear 
in future data; however a curve drawn from the simpler model responds more to the real relation 
that drives present and, we suppose, future data as well. 
 The challenge to a Bayesian analysis is to find a way of capturing these last informal 
thoughts in a more precise analysis. The natural way to do this is to break up the inference 
problem into two parts.43 The first part requires us to consider only models. These are sets of 
                                                
42 Perhaps it is unfair to introduce a more elevated perspective that affirms this judgment against 
the cubic CUBbest. The data plotted was generated artificially from the model yi = xi + errori, so 
the linear LINbest has actually done a very good job of identifying the trend y=x. 
43 Traditional non-Bayesian statistical methodology implements this two part procedure by 
testing whether deviations in the coefficients B and C of CUB from zero are statistically 
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hypotheses indexed by parameters. For example, LIN above is the set of linear functions with 
parameters A and B taking all real values. CUB above is the set of all cubic functions with the 
parameters A, B, C and D taking all real values. In the first part we decide which model is 
appropriate to the data. For DATA above, we presume that would turn out to be LIN and not 
CUB. In the second part of the inference problem, we then find the curve that fits the data best 
just within that selected model. 
 Implementing this program within Bayesianism runs into several difficulties. The 
functions of LIN are a subset of those of CUB, for CUB reverts to LIN if we set C=D=0. So if 
we compute the posterior probabilities of the models on the DATA, we will always find 
P(LIN | DATA)  ≤ P(CUB | DATA) 
from which it follows that that the model LIN can never be more probable on the DATA than the 
model CUB. So it seems that we cannot have a straightforward Bayesian justification for 
preferring LIN over CUB. 
 Slightly less than straightforward grounds can be found. We compare not the posterior 
probabilities of models, but the boosts in probability each model sustains upon conditionalizing 
on the data. That is, in this modified approach, we would prefer LIN over CUB if the ratio P(LIN 
| DATA) / P(LIN) exceeds P(CUB | DATA) / P(CUB). The ratio of these two ratios is itself 
called the “Bayes’ factor.” 
 This modified criterion of the Bayes’ factor has some plausibility since it conforms to the 
spirit of the likelihood theory in that we consider changes in probability under conditionalization, 
not absolute values of the posterior probability. However the modified criterion rapidly runs into 
difficulties with prior probabilities. To compute P(LIN | DATA), for example, we would use 
Bayes’ theorem, in which the likelihood P(DATA | LIN) appears. This likelihood is really a 
compound quantity. It is a summation over the infinitely many curves that appear in the model 
LIN, corresponding to all possible values of A and B. That is, 
! 
P(DATA | LIN ) = p(DATA | A,B)p(A,B)dAdB
all  A,B
"  
The problematic term is p(A,B), which is the prior probability density for the parameters A and 
B given that LIN is the correct model. Since it expresses our distribution of belief over different 
                                                                                                                                                       
significant. If they are not, the null hypothesis of B=C=0 is accepted and estimation proceeds 
with the simple model LIN. 
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values of A and B prior to evidence, p(A,B) should favor no particular values of A or B. 
However it is familiar problem that no probability distribution can do this. If p(A,B) is any non-
zero constant, then it cannot be normalized to unity when we integrate over all possible values of 
A and B. 
 While no unqualified solution to these problems has emerged, it has proven possible to 
show that, for large data sets, the Bayes factor depends only weakly on the choice of the prior 
probability density. In that case, the model favored by the Bayes factor is the one that maximizes 
what is known as the Bayes Information Criterion (BIC): 
BIC = log Lbest – (k/2) log n 
where the maximum likelihood Lbest is the likelihood of the data when conditionalized on the 
best fitting curve in the model, k is the number of parameters in the model and n is the size of the 
data set. (For LIN, k is 2; for CUB, k is 4.) For further discussion, see Wasserman (2000). 
 In maximizing BIC, we tradeoff accuracy of fit (expressed in the maximizing of 
likelihood) against the simplicity of the model (expressed in the number of parameters k). This 
was not the goal in constructing BIC; it was generated from an analysis that seeks the most 
probable model on the evidence. An analogous criterion can be generated by directly seeking the 
model with the greatest predictive power, as opposed to the one that is most probable. This 
criterion, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), advocated by Forster and Sober (1994), is 
given by 
AIC = log Lbest – k 
The rationale is that overtly seeking predictive power is a surer way to get to a truth that extends 
beyond the particular data at hand. Seeking the most probable model risks favoring the vagaries 
of the particular data at hand. 
 The connection to prediction is achieved through the notion of “cross-validation.” While 
we cannot now test the predictive powers of a model against presently unknown data, we can 
simulate such a test by dividing the data at hand into two parts. We use the first part to generate a 
best fitting hypothesis in the model and then we check how well the resulting hypothesis fits the 
remaining data. In a large set of N data, we leave out one datum and use the remaining N-1 to 
generate hypotheses from the model. We then average the errors in fitting the original datum. If 
we allow each datum successively to be left out in the procedure and average the resulting 
scores, we recover an estimate of the predictive powers of the model. That estimate turns out to 
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approach the AIC statistic for large N. (Forster, 2002, p. S128; Browne, 2000.) The presumption 
is that predictive powers manifested within a known data set in this computation will persist 
beyond the confines of that data set. 
 It remains an open question whether likelihoods may be used as the basis of assessment 
of models when we need to find an appropriate accommodation of accuracy, simplicity and 
predictive power. That all the proposals above fail has been suggested recently by Forster 
(forthcoming, manuscript). He has devised examples of pairs of models with the same number of 
parameters k that also deliver the same likelihood and maximum likelihood for a specified set of 
data. As a result, considerations of likelihood alone or the more refined BIC or AIC are unable to 
discriminate between the models. However it is evident from informal considerations that one 
model is predictively superior to the other. 
 Forster’s simplest example44 draws on a set of data with three points <xi,yi>: 
<1, 1>,  <2,2>,  <3,3>                                                    (DATA’) 
The first model, Ha: yi = axi, comprises four functions 
H1/2: yi = (1/2) xi      H1: yi = xi      H2: yi = 2xi      H3: yi = 3xi 
corresponding to the parameter values a = 1/2, 1, 2, 3. The relation of this model to DATA’ is 
shown in Figure 3. 
 
                                                
44 This example was presented in a talk by Malcolm Forster, “Is Scientific Reasoning Really that 
Simple?” in “Confirmation, Induction and Science” London School of Economics, March 8 – 
March 10, 2007, on March 8. 
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Figure 3. Models  H and K 
 
The second model, Ka:yi = xi/a + (a-1)2/a, comprises four functions 
K1: yi = xi     K2: yi = xi/2 + 1/2     K3: yi = xi/3 + 4/3      K4: yi = xi/4 + 9/4 
The relation of this model to DATA’ is shown in Figure 3. 
 Which model does DATA’ favor? The computation of the likelihoods of the individual 
functions is easy since they are all zero or one. The only non-zero likelihoods are 
P(DATA’ | H1)  =  1        P(DATA’ | K1)  =  1 
We assume that the prior probabilities of functions within each model is the same. That is45 
P(Ha | H)  =  1/4     for a = 1/2, 1, 2, 3 
P(Ka | K)  =  1/4     for a = 1, 2, 3, 4 
Thus the likelihood associated with each model is the same 
P(DATA’ | H)  = P(DATA’ | H1) x P(H1 | H)  =  1/4 
P(DATA’ | K)  = P(DATA’ | K1) x P(H1 | K)  =  1/4 
Hence, we cannot use DATA’ to discriminate between the two models H and K by means of 
their maximum likelihoods or the likelihoods of the models. Moreover, we cannot discriminate 
between them by means of BIC or AIC; for both models agree on the maximum likelihood and 
the number of parameters, k=1. 
                                                
45 In these formulae, read H = H1/2v H1v H2v H3 and K = K1v K2v K3 v K4. 
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 While all the likelihood based instruments fail to discriminate between the models, 
informal considerations favor the model H. For it requires only one datum from DATA’, such as 
<1,1>, to fix the function y=x in H that fits the remaining data. The remaining two data points act 
as tests of the model; or, we may view them as successful predictions. However it takes two data 
points from DATA’ to fix the function in K that fits the remaining data. The datum <1,1>, for 
example, is compatible with both K1 and K2. A second datum is needed to decide between them. 
Hence only one datum remains to test the function fitted; or the model needs more data before it 
can make successful predictions. As a result we informally judge that the model H is better tested 
and predictively stronger and thus better warranted by the evidence. (For discussion of this 
aspect of curve fitting, see Glymour, 1980, Ch. VIII.)46 
 For further discussion of Bayesian and Likelihood based analyses of this problem, see 
Howson and Urbach (2006, 288-96) and Forster and Sober (2004) (which includes commentary 
by Michael Kruse and Robert J. Boik). 
5.6 A Neutral Starting Point: The Second Problem of the Priors 
 Bayesian confirmation theory depicts learning from evidence as the successive 
conditionalization of a prior probability distribution on evidence so that the resulting posterior 
probability distributions increasingly reflect just the evidence learned. As we trace back along 
this chain of conditionalization, we expect to come to epistemically more neutral probability 
distributions, reflecting our lesser knowledge earlier in the process. The problem of the priors in 
both forms developed here is that the structure of Bayeisan confirmation theory essentially 
precludes neutral probability distributions. In the first problem of the priors (Section 4.3 above), 
we saw that the additivity of probability measures precludes their representing epistemic states of 
complete ignorance. Here we shall see that the Bayesian dynamics of refute and rescale also 
precludes a different sort of neutrality of the probability distribution. Bayesian dynamics makes 
                                                
46 The informal considerations invoked here may appear more familiar if we vary the example 
slightly. Imagine that we are to choose between the model H: y=ax and L:y=ax +b for DATA’. 
Then we would allow that H is better warranted since a single datum is needed to fix the 
parameter a in H; whereas two data are needed to fix the two parameters a and b in L. 
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it impossible to select a prior probability distribution that does not exercise a controlling 
influence on subsequent course of conditionalization. 47 
 The essential problem is suggested by the notion of refute and rescale dynamics. The 
results of conditionalization must already be present in the prior probability; all that 
conditionalization does is to remove those parts of the prior probability distribution attached to 
outcomes refuted by the evidence to reveal the pre-existing distribution of belief between the 
unrefuted outcomes. This same point is evident if we recall the formula governing conditional 
probabilities 
P(H|E) = P(H&E)/P(H) 
This formula tells us that P(H|E), the degree of belief we should have in H given that we have 
learned E, is fixed by the two prior probabilities P(H&E) and P(H). That means that if we fully 
specify our prior probabilities over some outcome space, we have also delivered an exhaustive 
catalog of what our belief in each outcome would be, given that we have learned some other 
outcome. For from being neutral, the prior probability distribution anticipates how our beliefs 
will evolve as we learn any sequence of admissible outcomes and different prior probability 
distributions can yield courses that differ greatly. This consideration gives further grounds for the 
abandoning of such terms as “ignorance priors” or “informationless priors” in favor of “priors 
constructed by some formal rule” as reported in Section 4.4 above. 
 As with the first problem, objectivists have the most acute difficulty with this second 
problem of the priors. For they are committed to there being one, appropriate prior probability 
distribution in any given epistemic situation. Yet none can supply the neutral starting point 
appropriate in the absence of all evidence. So the objectivist must either accept the unpalatable 
conclusion that the initial prior probability contains information without evidential warrant; or 
that Bayesian dynamics can only be used once we have learned enough by other means to make 
a properly grounded selection of the prior probability. 
 Subjectivists at first seem to have a better response. For them, a prior probability is 
simply a statement of personal opinion with no pretensions of evidential warrant. As evidence 
accumulates and is incorporated into the probability distributions by conditionalization, limit 
                                                
47 The phrase “problem of the priors” seems to mean somewhat different to things to different 
authors. For further discussion, see Earman (1992, pp. 57-59) and Mellor (2005, pp. 94-95). 
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theorems assures us of a merging of opinion onto a unique distribution that properly represents 
the bearing of evidence. (For discussion of these theorems, see Earman (1992, Ch. 6).) However 
this solution comes at some cost. At any finite stage of the process, the posterior probability 
distribution is an unknown mix of unwarranted opinion and warranted support. While the limit 
theorems may assure us that, in particular circumstances, the mix will eventually converge onto 
warranted support, at any definite state we may be arbitrarily far from it. 48 Imagine that we have 
collected some very large set of evidence Elarge and we are interested in its bearing on some 
hypothesis H. It will always be possible for a determined mischief maker to identify some prior 
probabilities for P(H&Elarge) and P(Elarge) so that P(H|Elarge) is as close to one as you like or as 
close to zero as you like. 
5.7 The Prior Probability of Universal Generalizations 
 Neither objectivist nor subjectivist fares well if zero or unit prior probability has been 
assigned injudiciously to some outcome. Then Bayesian dynamics becomes completely 
dogmatic. For once they have been assigned zero or unit probability, it follows from Bayes’ 
theorem that these assignments are unrevisable by conditionalization.49 The complete disbelief 
of a zero prior probability and the complete belief of a unit probability will persist indefinitely. 
In concrete terms, this sort of dogmatism is a familiar if unwelcome phenomenon. Consider the 
dogmatic conspiracy theorist who discounts the benign explanation of a catastrophe in favor of 
an elaborate conspiracy committed by some secret agency. Once a zero prior probability has 
been assigned to the benign explanation, no failure to reveal the secret agency’s intervention or 
even existence can restore belief in the benign explanation. Rather Bayes’ theorem will provide 
mounting assurance that each failure is further evidence of the perfection of the secret agency’s 
cover-up. 
 While the best Bayesian advice would seem to be very cautious before assigning a zero 
prior probability, there are suggestions, reviewed in more detail in Earman (1992, §4.2, 4.3), that 
                                                
48 Here is the obligatory reporting of Keynes’ quip: “In the long run we are all dead.” 
49 Once P(H)=0, Bayes’ theorem (B) requires P(H|E)=0 for all admissible E. (Conditionalizing 
on evidence E for which P(E)=0 leads to an undefined posterior P(H|E).) It follows that for any 
H’=~H for which P(H’)=1, P(H’|E)=1 as well. 
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hypotheses with the power of universal generalizations ought to be assigned a zero prior 
probability. These concerns arise for any hypotheses H that entails a countable infinity of 
consequences E1, E2, … 50 Considering only the first n consequences we have 
P(H) = P(H|E1&…&En). P(En|E1&…&En-1). P(En-1|E1&…&En-2). … P(E2| E1). P(E1) 
Popper (1959, Appendix VII) urged that we should expect the instances E1, E2, … of a universal 
generalization H to be equiprobable and independent of one another. That is, 
P(En|E1&…&En-1). P(En-1|E1&…&En-2). … P(E2| E1). P(E1) 
= P(En). P(En-1). … P(E2).P(E1) = P(E1)n 
But since this must hold for arbitrarily large n and with P(E1)<1, it follows that the prior P(H)=0. 
The obvious weakness of Popper’s proposal is that the very fact that E1, E2, … are instances of a 
universal generalization H suggests that they are not independent. However, just a little 
dependence between E1, E2, … is not enough to allow a non-zero prior for H. Inspection of the 
above expression for P(H) shows that P(H)>0 entails 
Limn∞ P(En|E1&…&En-1) = 1 
That is, finitely many favorable instances of H eventually make us arbitrarily sure that the next 
instance will be favorable. That was an outcome that Jeffrey (1983, p. 194) felt sufficiently akin 
to “jumping to conclusions” to want to renounce non-zero prior probabilities on universal 
hypotheses. 
 Lest this commitment to the projectability of the hypothesis not seem immodest, the 
analysis needs only a slight modification to make it more striking. Group the instances E1, E2, … 
into sets that grow very rapidly in size. For example 
F1=E1   F2=E2&…&E10     F3= E11&…&E100      … 
so that 
F1&…&Fn = E1&…&E(10n-1) 
Each of the Fi is a consequence of H, so the above analysis can be repeated with Fi substituted 
for Ei to infer that p(H)>0 entails 
                                                
50 The simplest example is a universal generalization that asserts, “For all x, Q(x).” where x 
ranges over a countably infinite set of individuals a, b, c, … Its consequences are Q(a), Q(b), … 
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Limn∞ P(E1&…&E(10n+1)|E1&…&E(10n)) = 1 
That is, if we assign non-zero prior probability to an hypotheses with the power of a universal 
generalization, eventually we are willing to project from some finite set of its positive instances 
to arbitrarily many more at arbitrarily high probability. 
 The point is not that there is something intrinsically wrong with such immodesty. Indeed 
for the right hypothesis, this may be just the appropriate epistemic attitude. The point is that 
assigning a zero or a non-zero prior probability to a hypothesis with the power of a universal 
generalization is never neutral. The former commits us dogmatically never to learning the 
hypothesis; the second, no matter how small the non-zero prior, commits us to its arbitrary 
projectability on finite favorable evidence. There is no intermediate value to assign that leaves 
our options open. Our inductive course is set once the prior is assigned. 
 Finally, one sees that some significant prior knowledge is needed if we are to assign the 
non-zero prior probabilities prudently. For a countably infinite set of outcomes E1, E2, … 
corresponds to an uncountable infinity of universal hypotheses: each hypothesis corresponds to 
one of the uncountably many combinations of the Ei and their negations ~Ei. However we can 
assign non-zero prior probability to at most countably many of these hypotheses. That is, loosely 
speaking, when we assign our priors, we are selecting in advance the measure zero subset that we 
will be prepared to learn and dogmatically banishing the rest to disbelief no matter what 
evidence may accrue. 
5.8 Uncertain Evidence 
 The versions of Bayesian confirmation theory considered so far depict learning as an 
absolute: if we are given evidence E, it cannot be doubted. That is quite unrealistic. No datum is 
ever certain and it is not uncommon in science that the accumulation of later evidence leads one 
to doubt the correctness of evidence collected earlier. Something like this could be incorporated 
into traditional Bayesianism if we separate, say, the inerrant sense datum D: “my retina senses a 
plesiosaur like shape on the surface of Loch Ness” from the fallible evidence E: “I saw a 
plesiosaur on Loch Ness.” That fallibility could then enter the analysis through the conditional 
probability P(E|D). This solution complicates the analysis without ultimately allowing that all 
evidence is fallible, for it merely pushes the inerrancy deeper into an elaborated outcome space. 
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 A direct solution has been proposed by Jeffrey (1983, Ch. 11). Standard Bayesianism 
introduced evidence E by by conditionalizing, which forces unit probability onto E. Jeffrey 
instead proposed that we merely shift a lesser amount of probability to E, commensurate with our 
confidence in it. This non-Bayesian shift from initial probability Pi to final probability Pf is then 
propagated through the outcome space by Jeffrey’s rule. For this simplest case of evidence that 
partitions the outcome space into {E, ~E}, the rule asserts that, for each proposition A, 
Pf(H) = Pi(H|E).Pf(E) + Pi(H|~E).Pf(~E) 
The distinctive property of this rule is that it leaves unaffected our judgments what the 
probability of H would be were E definitely true or definitely false. That is, for all H, it satisfies 
Pi(H|E)= Pf(H|E) and Pi(H|~E)= Pf(H|~E). The uniqueness of Jeffrey’s rule follows in that it 
proves to be the only rule that satisfies these two conditions (Jeffrey, 1983, p. 169; Howson and 
Urbach, 2006, p. 85). Jeffrey’s rule reduces to ordinary conditionalization if the evidence E is 
certain, Pf(E)=1. 
 One unappealing aspect of Jeffrey’s rule is that the order in which it is applied in 
successive applications matters. That is, if we apply it first on a partition {E,~E} and then 
{F,~F}, in general we do not arrive at the same final probability distribution as when the order is 
reversed. (See Diaconis and Zabell, 1982.) 
 In the context of the Shafer-Dempster theory (Section 4.2 above), Dempster’s rule of 
combination allows uncertain evidence to be combined with other belief distributions in an 
analogous way, but one that is independent of the order of combining. With appropriate 
restrictions, Dempster’s rule of combination can yield ordinary Bayesian conditionalization as a 
special case. See Diaconis and Zabell (1986) for discussion of the relationship between Jeffrey’s 
rule and Dempster’s rules. 
6. Further Challenges 
 This concluding collects mention of some of the many further challenges to Bayesian 
confirmation theory that can be found in the literature. 
 In a letter to Nature and a subsequent article, Popper and Miller (1983, 1987) urged that 
the probabilistic support evidence E provides an hypothesis H in Bayesian confirmation theory is 
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not inductive support. Their argument depended upon decomposing H into conjunctive parts by 
the logical identity 
H = (H←E)&(HvE) 
where the first conjunct, “H, if E,” is (H←E) = (Hv~E). Since the second conjunct (HvE) is 
deductively entailed by E, they identify the first, (H←E), as “containing all of [H] that goes 
beyond [E]” (1983, p. 687) and require that E supplies inductive support for H only in so far as it 
supports this part that is not deductively entailed by E. However it is easy to show that 
P(H←E|E) ≤ P(H←E) so that (H←E) never accrues probabilistic support from E. 
 While Popper and Miller’s argument drew much discussion (for a survey see Earman, 
1992, pp. 95-98), the decisive flaw was already identified immediately by Jeffrey (1984), who 
objected that (H←E) is not the part of H that goes beyond E. It is rests on a confusion of “part” 
with “deductive consequence.” While we might think of theorems as logical parts of the axioms 
that entail them, that sense of part no longer works when inductive relations are the concern. For 
example, let H be that my lost keys are in my office (“office”) or in my bedroom (“bedroom”) 
and E is the evidence that they are in my house. Then (H←E) is the enormous disjunction 
office v bedroom v Mars v Jupiter v Saturn v … 
where the ellipses include all places not in my house. It is as peculiar to call this disjunction a 
part of the original hypothesis as it is unsurprising that it is not probabilistically confirmed by the 
evidence. 
 Another challenge to Bayesian confirmation theory comes from what first appears as an 
unlikely source. Over recent decades, there has been a mounting body of evidence that people do 
not assess uncertainty in accord with the strictures of probability theory. The most famous 
example comes from Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) experiments that showed that people are 
quite ready to contradict the monotonicity of a probability measure—the property that an 
outcome is never less probable that each of its logical consequences. In the case of “Linda,” they 
found that people would affirm that a suitably described character Linda is more likely to be a 
bank teller and feminist than a consequence of this possibility, that she is a bank teller. One 
response to this body of work is to lament the unreliability of people’s intuitions about 
uncertainty and the need for them to receive training in the probability calculus. Another 
response notes that we humans have been dealing more of less successfully with uncertainty for 
a long time; this success extends to much of science, where uncertainties are rarely treated by 
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systematic Bayesian methods. So perhaps we should seek another approach based a little more 
closely on what people naturally do. Cases like “Linda” suggest that we naturally try to select the 
one conclusion that best balances the risk of error against informativeness and detach it from the 
evidence. That is quite compatible with preferring to detach less probable outcomes. When told a 
coin was tossed, most people would infer to the outcome “heads or tails” as opposed to “heads or 
tails or on edge” even though the latter is more probable and a certainty. 
 In philosophy of science, if a numerical calculus is used to assess the bearing of evidence, 
it is most often the probability calculus. In other domains, that is less so. In the artificial 
intelligence literature, alternative calculi proliferate. They include the Shafer-Dempster theory, 
possibility theory (Zadeh, 1978) as well as numerical systems generated for particular contexts, 
such as the MYCIN system applied in medical diagnostics (Shortliffe and Buchanan1985). One 
motivating factor has been pragmatic. A probabilistic analysis requires a prohibitively large 
number of quantities to be fixed for the general case. In an outcome space with n atomic 
propositions, there are of the order of n! conditional probabilities. Seen from that perspective, 
possibility theory’s simple rule for disjunction is appealing: the possibility of AvB is just the 
larger of the possibilities of A or B individually. That same rule would seem disastrous to the 
systematic philosopher of science schooled with Bayesian intuitions, who will wonder why the 
rule does not distinguish the cases of A and B coincident or mutually exclusive and all those in 
between. The debate between proponents of the different calculi, including probabilistic systems, 
has been fierce. The principle goal seems to be to establish that each proponent’s system has the 
same or greater expressive power than another’s. (See for example Cheeseman, 1986; Zadeh, 
1986.) 
 The issue of “stopping rules” has entered the philosophy of science literature from the 
debate between Bayesian and Neyman-Pearson statisticians. It pertains to a deceptively simple 
plan for assuring belief in a false hypothesis. Assume we have a fair coin. On average, on 
repeated tosses, it will show heads with a frequency of about 0.5. The actual frequency will 
fluctuate from this expected 0.5 and there will always be some definite but small probability that 
the observed frequency is arbitrarily far removed from the expected. In order to advance the 
misperception that the coin is not fair, we toss it repeatedly, waiting mischievously for chance to 
realize one of these rare removals that is possible but very unlikely for a fair coin. That is our 
“stopping rule.” When the rare removal happens we report the resulting count of heads and tails 
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as evidence that the coin is not fair. The plan can be generalized to seek disconfirmation of any 
statistical hypothesis. We accumulate observations, waiting for chance fluctuations to deliver 
results that can only arise with low probability if the hypothesis is true. 
 The result is troubling for Bayesians. For them, the import of evidence is fully 
determined by the likelihood ratio and that likelihood ratio has been contrived to favor arbitrarily 
strongly the falsity of the hypothesis. That the experimenter intended to generate a deceptive 
result is irrelevant; the intentions of the experimenter collecting the data do not appear in Bayes’ 
theorem. Neyman-Pearson statisticians have a ready escape that is not available to the Bayeisan: 
the strategy of “try and try again until you get a statistically significant result” is not a good test 
of the hypothesis. Correspondingly, the procedure that uses this stopping rule does not count as a 
severe test of the hypothesis in the sense of Mayo (1996, §11.3, 11.4). 
 The Bayesian response has been to reaffirm that the likelihoods are all that is relevant to 
discerning the bearing of evidence and also to point out that the stopping rule may never be 
satisfied, so that the planned disconfirmation can fail. That is, assume that a Bayesian agent 
assigns a prior probability p to some hypothesis and decides to accumulate evidence concerning 
the hypothesis until the posterior probability has risen to q>p. Kadane, Schervisch and 
Seidenfeld (1996) show that, if the hypothesis is false, the agent’s probability that the stopping 
rule is eventually satisfied is given by 





Therefore, the closer the desired posterior probability q is set to one, the closer the probability of 
stopping comes to zero; that is, the probability as assessed by the agent approaches one that the 
experiment will continue indefinitely without returning the result sought in the stopping rule.51 
For more discussion see see Savage et al., (1962, pp. 17-20 and subsequence discussion), Mayo 
(1996, §11.3, 11.4) and Kadane, Schervish, and Seidenfeld, (1996). 
                                                
51 If a tenfold boost in probability is sought, so q/p = 10, we must have p≤0.1 to start with and 




 This chapter has reviewed many challenges to Bayesian confirmation theory. Some are 
global, reflecting differences in the very conception of inductive inference and the inductive 
enterprise in science. Others are more narrowly targeted to specific commitments of Bayesian 
confirmation theory. That there are so many challenges is a reflection of the dominance that 
Bayesian confirmation theory now enjoys in philosophy of science. It offers a well-articulated 
account of inductive inference in science that is of unrivalled precision, scope and power. In this 
regard it greatly outshines its competitors. Abductive accounts—inference to the best 
explanation—are still stalled by the demand for a precise account of their central notion, 
explanation, whereas Bayesian confirmation theory suffers from the reverse: excessive 
elucidation of its central notion, probability. This precision and depth of articulation is part of 
what enables the challenges to Bayesian confirmation theory to be mounted. For it is only after a 
position is clearly articulated that its weaknesses may also be discerned. When a new Goliath 
enters the arena, many would be Davids come with their pebbles. 
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